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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 
I.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this introduction is to afford an overall picture of this study. The 
arguments presented in this section are offered to show, in the first place, the main 
motivation for this study and its relevance, as well as a preliminary overview of the broad 
research on the main determinants of trade credit. In second place, we describe the 
characteristics of different institutional environments that in our view have an impact on the 
trade credit extension. Finally, we present our objectives and the structure of the study. 
 
I.2. Motivation for the study and relevance 
 
Corporate finance decision-making is often split into three different focal points, 
capital structure, capital budget and working capital. Capital structure has been widely 
studied by financial scholars and has to do with answering the question: what is the optimal 
combination of sources of finance? The capital budget decision consists of making the 
optimal choice from among the different long term investment opportunities faced by a 
firm. The working capital decision embraces, mainly, cash management, inventory 
decisions and trade credit policies. The extension of trade credit and its use by firms is the 
main subject of this thesis. 
Trade credit is widely used by firms among different countries around the world. 
Although its use presents variations among firms from different countries, it represents a 
high proportion of the firm’s assets, sometimes accounting for more than a quarter of them. 
Its importance as a source of finance by firms triggered the interest of scholars in studying 
its determinants. Indeed, the question of why firms extend trade credit instead of leaving 
this function to financial intermediaries should be answered. With the aim of respond this 
question scholars have sought the main trade credit determinants in different ways. Some of 
them divided trade credit determinants into financial, operational and commercial types. 
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Others have divided them into time-invariant and time-variant determinants. Several studies 
have focused on trade credit extension, others on trade credit demand. A number of them 
have concentrated on trade credit in transition economies or in developing countries and 
quite a few on trade credit during economic crises.  
Although all these studies have shed some light on trade credit motivations, we 
believe that there is still a lack of knowledge about trade credit in the existing literature. 
Indeed, models used to take in account only one approach in explaining trade credit. 
According to the financial view, trade credit is extended from firms with widespread access 
to credit from financial intermediaries to credit constrained firms. Papers based on the 
transaction costs argument posit that suppliers extend credit to buyers because they have 
advantages over banks in acquiring information about customers’ creditworthiness. Papers 
supported by commercial arguments argue that firms of unknown reputation must sell on 
credit to allow clients to access product quality before paying for it. We understand that 
trade credit may be determined by a trade-off between more than one theory. Indeed, when 
information between buyers and sellers is asymmetric, trade credit will be extended to 
allow clients to check the real quality of the product bought. However, in asymmetric 
information conditions, suppliers may tighten the terms of credit since buyers’ 
creditworthiness is doubtful. Another type of lacuna in trade credit studies concerns the 
influence of legal aspects such as creditors’ protection and accounting systems in trade 
credit usage. Finally, trade credit practices during economic crises are also little known as 
is the possibility of trade credit contagion. 
 
I.3. The different environments that have an impact on trade credit 
supply and demand. 
 
I.3.1. Legal aspects 
 
Legal rules vary greatly among countries and influence corporate finance patterns. 
These legal rules embrace different aspects and are related to the legal origin of a country. 
According to La Porta et al. (1998), commercial laws are derived from two legal traditions: 
common law and civil law. The first has its origin in England and the latter derives from 
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Roman law. Three major legal families gave rise to modern civil law: French, German and 
Scandinavian. 
La Porta et al. (1998) affirm that the common-law family embodies the law of 
England and those laws based on English law, that is, the former British colonies such as 
United States, Canada, Australia, India, and others such as Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zimbabwe, etc. In 
addition, they affirm that the French commercial code was written under Napoleon in 1807 
and was spread by his army to Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. It influences 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain and, since Portugal and Spain had had empires since the 
navigation discovery era, all their colonies were in turn also inspired by French civil law, as 
is the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and so on. Furthermore, they say that the German Commercial Code was 
written in 1897. This legal tradition was adopted by countries such as Austria, Japan, South 
Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and others. Scandinavian civil law was adopted especially by 
the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Some of the differences in legal features among countries include the level of 
investors’ legal protection, the level of creditors’ legal protection, the enforcement of laws 
and the accounting standards. Although all these features may influence financial patterns 
of firms, we believe that two of them have a particular impact on trade credit usage among 
firms from different countries: the level of creditors’ protection and the level of accounting 
standards. Following, we present some characteristics of both aspects, and in Chapter 3 we 
present the study of their influence on the trade credit extended. 
The aspects regarding the level of creditors’ protection considered in this work follow 
the analysis made by La Porta et al. (1998) of the general strategies of a creditor dealing 
with a defaulting firm: liquidation and reorganization. They create a creditor rights index 
that considers four features: i) when creditor consent is required in the reorganization 
procedure; ii) when secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds 
from a bankrupt firm; iii) when, during reorganization, an official is appointed by the 
creditors or by the judge to be in charge of the operation of the firm, and; iv) when secured 
creditors can take collateral from firms going through reorganization without waiting for 
the reorganization to finish. Based on the four aspects described above, La Porta et al. 
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(1998) affirm that the legal origin matters in the level of creditor protection. According to 
them, countries from Common-law systems offer the highest level of creditor protection 
and countries based on French Civil-law offer the worst. 
The influence of the level of creditor protection on trade credit policies has to do with 
the fact that the trade credit extended is expected to be negatively related to customers’ 
credit risk. As a consequence, in countries with high creditor protection the credit risk is 
likely to be less strong than in countries of low creditor protection. Although this 
assumption seems to be obvious, as far as we know it has only been studied for the case of 
credit extended by financial institutions and has not been tested in the case of trade credit 
extended from suppliers to customers. 
The influence of the accounting standards of a country on the credit extended is 
related to the useful information for credit analysis provided by accounting statements. The 
better the accounting systems of a country the clearer the information about firms’ financial 
situation for financial intermediaries. Of course, this outcome is likely to occur in the 
extension of trade credit too. A good and efficient accounting system mitigates the risk in 
extending any kind of credit since the information is clear and trustworthy. 
Again, the measure for accounting standards used in this work follows La Porta et al. 
(1998). They use an index constructed in 1991 for 44 countries. According to this paper, 
Scandinavian-civil-law countries present the highest quality in accounting standards, 
followed by common-law countries and the German-civil-law countries. The poorest 
accounting standards among the four legal origins are in those countries whose system stem 
from French-civil-law. 
 
I.3.2. Economic crises 
 
In the last 15 years several crises have started spreading uncertainty and, 
consequently, economic shocks around the world. Table 1 summarizes the main economic 
shocks from Mexico’s crisis in 1994 to the USA’s crisis in 2008. As will be explained in 
Chapter 4, we concentrate our research by analyzing trade credit used during the Argentine 
crisis of 2001/2002, the Brazilian crisis of 1999 and the Turkish collapse of 2001. In the 
following paragraphs we present some information about these crises without attempting to 
make an exhaustive description of the crises. 
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Table 1: Review of recent financial crisis 
Crisis name Crisis country Crisis period 
Tequila Mexico 1994 
Asian Flu Hong Kong or Thailand 1997 
Russian Virus Russia 1998 
Brazilian crisis Brazil 1999 
Turkish collapse Turkey 2001 
Terrorist acts and economic slow down U.S. 2001 
Argentina crisis Argentina 2001/2002 
Accounting scandals U.S. 2002 
Lula’s effect Brazil 2002 
Real Estate Markets U.S. 2008/2009 
 
Following the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian default of 1998, Argentina went 
through a strong economic crisis in 2001 and 2002 that caused negative growth rates and 
increased unemployment. Two causes for the Argentine economic crisis have been pointed 
out by the literature: the devaluation of the Brazilian Real against the Argentine Peso and 
the persistent deterioration in fiscal revenues. During 2001 there was an increase in the 
distrust in the Argentine economy and consequently in the government’s capability of 
honoring its debt. The international reserves, which in the beginning of the year 
corresponded to US$21 billion dropped to US$15 billion in August. Undoubtedly, 
Argentina was going through a serious confidence crisis characterized by the flight of a 
large amount of capital (Ferrari and Cunha, 2008). 
During the year 1999, the Brazilian currency (Real) lost its value by more than 60%, 
dropping from US$1.20 in the beginning of January to US$1.98 at the end of January. 
Brazilian reserves in dollars decreased 18%, from US$44 billion to US$36 billion during 
the year, as a consequence of investors’ uncertainty about the Brazilian economy and the 
government effort in defending its currency. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 
by just 0.25% from 1998 to 1999 when it was measured in constant market prices in 
national currency, but the GDP decreased by 30.47% when it was measured in US$ as a 
consequence of the currency devaluation. The total amount of credit extended to the private 
sector as a percentage of the GDP presents a smooth decline in 1999 and 2000. However, it 
was decreasing since 1995, and it only started to increase in 20051. All this information 
about the Brazilian 1999 economic scenario allows us to suppose the occurrence of trade 
                                                 
1
 Source: International Monetary Found 
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credit contagion and to presume that, in this specific period, the trade credit policies of 
firms have changed. 
The Turkish collapse of 2001 was characterized by a depreciation of 40% in its 
currency, the Lira, which as a consequence made repayment of debt in foreign currency 
difficult for banks and business. According to Akyurek (2006), the crisis harshly damaged 
the Turkish banking system and caused a contraction in economic activity that had never 
occurred before. Akyüz and Boratav (2003) affirm that the collapse of the Lira had a hard 
impact on those sectors with high exposure to exchange rate risks. In addition, public 
finances were tightening from rising external debt due to the collapse of the currency and 
the climb in interest rates. Furthermore, the reaction of exports to the sharp devaluation of 
the currency was delayed because of the interruption of the credit and supply systems. 
As described above, the three crises had a severe impact on the supply of credit. This 
situation may influence the supply of credit from suppliers towards their customers. The 
lack of available finance from financial intermediaries will certainly cause changes in the 
finance patterns of firms. Specifically, the way that firms finance their activities will 
change, which will cause consequences in trade credit supply and demand. 
 
I.4. Objectives and structure of the study 
 
Trade credits have been widely studied by financial scholars. The question of why 
firms extend credit to customers instead of focusing on their main activities is one of the 
causes of the existence of such an extensive body of literature on trade credit. Many others 
issues have triggered researchers’ interest in trade credit study, such as its importance as a 
mechanism of channeling credit from financial institutions to credit constrained firms, its 
relevance for start-up firms and its different uses by firms from different countries. 
Our research tries to contribute to the solution of some of these issues by showing 
that the relationship between suppliers and buyers is an agency relationship whose 
characteristics will determine the trade credit extended, by introducing the level of creditor 
protection and accounting standards into the analysis and by the analysis of firms from 
countries that have undergone an economic crisis in recent years. 
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The first objective of this research provides a complement to those theories that 
propose that trade credit is used to allow clients to check the quality of the product bought 
before paying for it, as a consequence of ex-ante asymmetric information between suppliers 
and buyers (Smith, 1987). Starting from this argument, also tested by Lee and Stowe, 1993; 
Long et al, 1993; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Wei and Zee, 1997; Pike et al., 2005, we go one 
step further by introducing an opposite effect of the asymmetric information on the trade 
credit extended, the moral hazard phenomenon. Since in asymmetric information conditions 
suppliers are unable to check the real creditworthiness of customers, they will reduce the 
trade credit extended. Therefore, trade credit policy in conditions of asymmetric 
information will be a result of a trade-off between the time that buyers require to check the 
quality of the product before paying for it and the time that suppliers will give them in 
order to mitigate the risk of buyer default. 
The second main objective of this research regards the effect of the institutional 
environment on the trade credit extended by providers. Specifically, we aim to find the 
influence of the level of creditor protection and the level of accounting standards on the risk 
of buyers not making the payment when it is due. The basis of our argument is that in 
countries with a low level of creditor protection the risk of credit is higher than in countries 
with a high level of creditor protection. Therefore, suppliers’ terms of credit will be 
influenced by this legal characteristic. Regarding the level of accounting standards, the 
basis of our argument is that the asymmetric information between suppliers and buyers is 
mitigated in countries with high quality accounting rules, which reduces credit risk. 
The third main objective is to check for empirical evidence of trade credit contagion 
during economic crises and also for some empirical evidence supporting the substitution 
hypothesis between trade credit and bank credit. Although several works have tested the 
financial theory to explain trade credit, often proposing that trade credit acts as a 
mechanism of credit channelling during monetary contractions or economic uncertainty 
(Meltzer, 1960; Schwartz, 1974; Nilsen, 2002 and Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan, 2003), there 
is a lack of knowledge about the effect of economic crises on trade credit demand. To fill 
this gap, we base our argument on the fact that firms with a high probability of insolvency 
and high levels of accounts receivable are more likely to be affected by an economic crisis 
and by credit contagion. 
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It is worth pointing out that all the above-mentioned objectives are connected and that 
the study of trade credit offer and trade credit demand can find in this thesis a solid basis 
for future research. With our objectives clearly delimited, we next describe the structure of 
this work. 
This thesis is composed of four chapters beyond this introduction. In each chapter we 
aim to analyze trade credit offer or trade credit demand determinants by considering 
different samples of firms, from different countries with different legal systems, levels of 
creditor protection and accounting standards. We also consider the impact of economic 
crisis periods in these trade credit determinants. 
In the next chapter we study trade credit supply by proposing a model based on the 
agency theory in which the relationship between suppliers and customers consists of an 
agency relationship in that two phenomena arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
former is a problem that occurs when there is ex-ante asymmetric information between 
suppliers and buyers. In this case, clients do not know ex-ante the quality of the goods they 
are buying and, as a consequence, will require large terms of credit to assess the quality of 
the product before paying for it. The latter consists of the possibility of the contractual 
relationship not being carried out by the client, i.e., the likelihood that payment will not be 
made when due, since sellers do not know enough about buyers’ creditworthiness. 
Therefore, the proposed model posits that trade credit supply is a result of a tradeoff 
between both phenomena. Using a sample of manufacturing firms from the United 
Kingdom comprising four years, 1999 to 2002, we run a fixed-effects model and find that 
the adverse selection phenomenon is directly related to trade credit extended and that the 
moral hazard phenomenon is negatively related to trade credit, however only at low levels. 
The main conclusion of this finding is that, although suppliers tend to tighten terms of 
credit when  the customers’ risk increase, their effort will never be enough when this risk 
becomes too high. 
Chapter 3 prolongs the previous analysis but using a sample of firms comprising 
thirteen countries of different legal origins and consequently different levels of creditor 
protection and accounting standards. In these analyses we consider the question of how 
these legal features influence the negative relationship between trade credit extended and 
moral hazard costs. In this paper we also use the panel data methodology, which allows us 
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to control for individual heterogeneity and for the problem of the endogeneity. Results 
show that high levels of creditor protection and high quality in accounting standards 
mitigate the negative relationship between trade credit and moral hazard. This occurs 
because high levels of creditor protection increase suppliers’ probability of receiving 
payment for the goods sold, which reduces moral hazard costs. Furthermore, high quality in 
accounting standards mitigates information asymmetries between sellers and buyers and 
consequently diminishes moral hazard costs. 
In the Chapter 4, our focus changes to the explanation of trade credit demand during 
crisis periods. In this study we use a sample of firms from three countries that have recently 
gone through an economic crisis: Argentina, Brazil and Turkey. Although in the last decade 
and at the beginning of this one, many other crises have occurred, we had data limitations 
that have impeded their inclusion in the study. We argue that trade credit presents time-
variant and time-invariant determinants. The main results of this chapter as regards time-
invariant determinants are that trade credit received by firms depends on their bargaining 
power to require large periods of credit from suppliers; the existence of high levels of 
investment opportunities and the access to credit from financial institutions. As regards 
time-variant determinants, trade credit depends on the insolvency risk of buyers. If buyers 
are considered highly vulnerable to an economic and credit contraction resulting from an 
economic crisis, they will delay payments to suppliers, giving rise to a trade credit 
contagion effect. 
This research culminates with a presentation of the main findings in Chapter 5. These 
main findings will allow us to defend the thesis proposed in this work in that: “Trade credit 
demanded and extended by firms is a result of the influence of internal factors (such as the 
moral hazard, the adverse selection, the bargaining power and the investment opportunities 
presented by the customer firm) and is also influenced by some external factors that 
characterize the legal and the economic environment (such as the level of creditor 
protection, the accounting standards and the economic situation).” 
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CHAPTER II – AN AGENCY MODEL TO EXPLAIN 
TRADE CREDIT POLICY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
II.1. Introduction 
 
Trade credit is a very important source of financing for firms. Although it is an old 
practice, it is not completely understood. Regarding trade credit, there are two strands of 
literature. The first focuses on studying the demand for trade credit, which is closely related 
to lending relationships and lines of credit. The papers in this strand of literature are mainly 
based on the argument that firms would increase the level of trade credit used when their 
alternative sources of finance are limited, in that trade credit is an important alternative for 
short and long term bank debt (see, for instance, Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995; Deloof and Jegers, 1999; Danielson and Scott, 2004; Alphonse et al., 2004; 
Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). The second strand of literature studies the supply of trade 
credit (see, for instance, Long et al., 1993; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Wei and Zee,1997; Ng 
et al., 1999; Pike et al, 2005). There are also papers such as that of Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) and Marotta (2005), which study the trade credit from both points of view. 
Additionally, Marotta (2005) provides a study that takes into consideration important 
aspects of trade credit such as cash discounts and penalties for ex post delays. In our paper, 
we focus on the second strand, since we understand that the seller is the one who decides 
whether or not to offer trade credit and, consequently, trade credit policy can be better 
understood by taking this fact into account. This approach refers to the study of either the 
level of the accounts receivable or the average collection period. According to Long et al. 
(1993), the average collection period allows us to measure two separate aspects of trade 
credit: the length of time that the credit is outstanding and the fraction of total sales made 
on credit. 
In this second strand of literature, numerous theories have been proposed to explain 
the existence and use of trade credit, but none of them can provide a complete explanation 
of the topic. While some of the models are more consistent in the case of certain industries 
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or categories of products, others work better in a financially constrained environment. As 
far as we know, four types of explanation have been provided by economic literature: i) a 
theory based on transactions costs arguments (proposed by Schwartz, 1974); ii) a liquidity 
theory (suggested by Emery, 1984); iii) a tax theory (developed by Brick and Fung, 1984); 
and iv) a product quality theory (suggested by Smith, 1987). 
This paper focuses on explaining trade credit by using an agency model based on an 
extension of the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). We take into 
consideration the relation between a firm and its clients, an agency relation from which two 
phenomena arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. An adverse selection problem stems 
from the ex-ante asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. In this case buyers do 
not know ex-ante the characteristics and quality of the goods that are being bought. 
However, a moral hazard problem arises from the ex-post asymmetric information between 
sellers and buyers, which gives rise to the possibility that clients will not pay when 
payment is due. Therefore, we argue that trade credit policy is a result of the trade-off 
between the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena. Note that other authors (for 
example, Long et al., 1993) have taken into account the adverse selection phenomenon in 
explaining trade credit policy, but none of them have considered the moral hazard 
phenomenon. Consequently, from our point of view, the main contribution of this paper is 
to show the importance of the moral hazard phenomenon and it suggests that both 
phenomena together could explain trade credit policy. 
According to our argument, we have tested an agency model whose explanatory 
variables are those that explain the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena. The 
empirical evidence is provided from a sample of UK companies, where, according to 
previous evidence, trade credit is highly relevant and represents more than 62% of firms’ 
total debt (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002)2. Moreover, the estimation methodology used in this 
paper is panel data in order to control for individual heterogeneity. 
The results support our agency model. According to the adverse selection 
phenomenon, we find that smaller firms, those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets, 
                                                 
2
 These authors have made a decompositional analysis of capital structure for UK companies. According to 
them, determinants of gearing depends on the measure used to proxy it and consequently depend on which 
component of debt is being analysed. Their evidence shows that results are very sensitive to whether or not 
trade credit is included. 
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and those that are less profitable, tend to extend more trade credit. Regarding the moral 
hazard phenomenon, our empirical evidence reveals that the higher the proportion of 
variable costs and the higher the percentage of bad debts, the less trade credit offered. 
Concerning traditional models, our paper finds empirical evidence against tax and 
transactions costs theories. Furthermore, as in Marotta (2005), our results do not support 
the liquidity argument that links trade credit and credit rationing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the theories 
on trade credit policy. Our agency model explaining trade credit policy is developed in 
Section 3, and Section 4 describes the data set and methodology used. Section 5 shows our 
interpretations of the estimation results of our agency model and also tests traditional 
models. Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
II.2. Theories on trade credit policy 
 
Trade credit is one of the oldest forms of corporate financing and it continues to be 
very important at present; it refers to the financing provided by a seller to the client (Wei 
and Zee, 1997). To understand the concept of trade credit it is important to know the range 
of alternative credit arrangements that can occur in trade. Depending on the type of credit 
policy, payment can be made at different times. It can occur before delivery, on delivery or 
after delivery. In the last case, the seller may or may not offer discounts for prompt 
payment, depending on trade arrangements. When payment does not occur before or on 
delivery, trade credit is being extended and the seller assumes the credit risk. Otherwise, 
trade credit is not being offered and the buyer assumes the risk that the product may be of 
low quality. 
Although trade credit is a very useful source of resources for different kinds of firms, 
there is no clear explanation of it yet, as pointed out by Long et al. (1993). In the last three 
decades, several theories and models have appeared to explain trade credit. Most of these 
theories rely on market imperfections, such as the existence of taxes, transactions costs and 
asymmetric information, as shown in Figure 1.  
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II.2.1. Tax theory 
 
The decision whether or not to accept a trade credit depends on the ability to access 
other sources of funds. A buyer should compare different financing alternatives to find out 
which choice is the best. In trade between a seller and a buyer a post payment may be 
Product quality theory 
Transactions costs theory 
Tax theory 
Advantage in salvaging value from 
goods sold 
Advantage in controlling the buyer 
Advantage in informational 
acquisition 
Product quality guarantee 
Theories Argument 
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controlling 
Liquidity  
theory 
Trade credit providers have more 
access to other sources of financing 
 
Figure 1: Trade credit theories 
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offered, but it is not free, there is an implicit interest rate which is included in the final 
price. Therefore, to find the best source of financing, the buyer should check out the real 
borrowing cost in other sources of funds.  
Brick and Fung (1984) suggest that the tax effect should be considered in order to 
compare the cost of trade credit with the cost of other financing alternatives. The main 
reason for this is that if buyers and sellers are in different tax brackets, they have different 
borrowing costs, since interests are tax deductible. The authors’ hypothesis is that firms in a 
high tax bracket tend to offer more trade credit than those in low tax brackets. 
Consequently, only buyers in a lower tax bracket than the seller will accept credit, since 
those in a higher tax bracket could borrow more cheaply directly from a financial 
institution. Another conclusion is that firms allocated to a given industry and placed in a tax 
bracket below the industry average cannot profit from offering trade credit. Therefore, 
Brick and Fung (1984) suggest that firms cannot both use and offer trade credit. 
II.2.2. Transactions costs theory 
 
First developed by Schwartz (1974), this theory conjectures that suppliers may have 
an advantage over traditional lenders in checking the real financial situation or the credit 
worthiness of their clients. Suppliers also have a better ability to monitor and force 
repayment of the credit. All these superiorities may give suppliers a cost advantage when 
compared with financial institutions. Three sources of cost advantage were classified by 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) as follows: information acquisition, controlling the buyer and 
salvaging value from existing assets. 
The first source of cost advantage can be explained by the fact that sellers can get 
information about buyers faster and at lower cost because it is obtained in the normal 
course of business. That is, the frequency and the amount of the buyer’s orders give 
suppliers an idea of the client’s situation; the buyer’s rejection of discounts for early 
payment may serve to alert the supplier of a weakening in the credit-worthiness of the 
buyer, and sellers usually visit customers more often than financial institutions do. In his 
model, Smith (1987) concludes that in two-part credit terms with a high interest rate, those 
buyers that do not choose to take advantage of the discount can be identified as high risks, 
because they may be having financial difficulties. 
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Recently, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argued that the suppliers' monitoring 
advantage applies exclusively to input transactions. They posit that the source of suppliers' 
advantage is the input transaction itself. According to the authors, an input supplier does 
not incur in monitoring costs to know that an input transaction has been completed, but 
other lenders do. The main argument supporting the authors' proposition is the difference 
between cash and input. While the former is easily diverted, i.e., its use does not maximize 
lenders' expected return, the latter is not easily diverted and its illiquidity facilitates trade 
credit. 
The second source of cost advantage arises from the power of the seller to threaten 
buyers. In other words, in some cases there are only a few alternative suppliers for the 
product needed and, consequently, buyers have very restricted choice. In this case, 
suppliers can threaten to cut off future supplies if they note a reduction in the chances of 
repayment. Compared with suppliers, financial institutions do not have the same 
threatening power. This advantage can become stronger when either the buyers represent 
only a small part of the supplier’s sales or the supplier is part of a network and future 
community sanctions can be made by a group, which makes this threat much stronger 
(Kandori, 1992). Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found in McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999). Another interesting finding in this strand of literature was provided 
by Petersen and Rajan (1997), whose empirical results suggest that debtors are less willing 
to repay a distressed seller. Their argument is that threats of cutting off future supplies 
made by a supplier with financial problems are not so credible. 
The seller’s ability to salvage value from existing assets is the third source of cost 
advantage. In the case of buyer default, the seller can seize the goods that are supplied, of 
course financial institutions can reclaim the firm’s assets as well. The difference between 
them is that since the firms trading are very often from the same industry, the supplier 
already has a network to sell the goods and consequently repossessing and resale costs 
would be lower. Mian and Smith (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide two 
interesting approaches related to this cost advantage. The former obtain evidence 
supporting the idea that the more durable the goods, the better collateral they provide and 
the greater the credit offered by the suppliers. The latter point out that the extent to which 
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the customers transform the product is also very important. The less they are transformed, 
the easier it will be for the supplier to repossess and sell the asset using the same channel. 
Another important point refers to the relative value of the goods. Ng et al. (1999) 
consider that the value of a product differs between firms and financial institutions; i.e., if a 
product has more value as collateral to a seller than to a financial institution, the seller may 
have a cost advantage in recuperating the product and selling it again. In this situation, 
suppliers tend to offer cheaper credit than financial institutions because of the reduction of 
the credit risk. 
Another paper related to transactions costs is Emery (1987); this author hypothesizes 
that there is a positive relation between demand variability and credit offered. This 
hypothesis is based on the following argument. When demand fluctuates, a firm has two 
traditional reactions (production or price adjustment); however, both are very costly and a 
better decision could be taken in that the seller could change trade credit terms according to 
demand. Terms can be relaxed when demand drops and tightened when demand increases.  
In this case, trade credit can be seen as an operational tool. Long et al. (1993) obtain 
empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Their results show that firms with variable 
demand extend more trade credit than firms with stable demand. 
II.2.3. Liquidity theory 
 
This theory, first suggested by Emery (1984), proposes that credit rationed firms use 
more trade credit than those with normal access to financial institutions. The central point 
of this idea is that when a firm is financially constrained the offer of trade credit can make 
up for the reduction of the credit offer from financial institutions. In accordance with this 
view, those firms presenting good liquidity or better access to capital markets can finance 
those that are credit rationed. 
Several approaches have tried to obtain empirical evidence in order to support this 
assumption. For example, Nielsen (2002), using small firms as a proxy for credit rationed 
firms, finds that when there is a monetary contraction, small firms react by increasing the 
amount of trade credit accepted. As financially unconstrained firms are less likely to 
demand trade credit and more prone to offer it, a negative relation between a buyer’s access 
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to other sources of financing and trade credit use is expected. Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
obtained evidence supporting this negative relation. 
II.2.4. Product quality theory 
 
The trade credit relation gives rise to two problems. On the one hand, sellers do not 
usually know the real credit-worthiness of their buyers and; on the other, buyers do not 
properly know the quality of the product that is being acquired. To solve the first problem, 
Smith (1987) suggests a model where sellers offer two-part credit terms because they can 
recognize potential defaults faster than financial intermediaries. And, as commented in 
Section 2.2, there are many other arguments supporting the idea that suppliers have cost 
advantages in acquiring knowledge about a buyer’s financial situation. Regarding the 
second problem, Smith (1987) also claims that with asymmetric information about product 
quality, sellers offer trade credit to allow buyers to verify product quality before payment. 
Other options to reduce the cost of the above-mentioned problem is to offer money-
back guarantees and warranties. Trade credit has some advantages when compared with 
these two. First, in a case of money-back or warranties, if the seller is not in business any 
more, the buyer can be damaged. Second, when payment is made at the time of sale, a 
client who wants to obtain the advantages of the money-back system must try to convince 
the seller that the quality of the product is not as promised. 
As pointed out by Smith (1987), one of the major purposes of trade credit is to allow 
clients to assess product quality prior to payment; however, this is not true for some 
categories of product. Therefore, this theory works better in some industries whose product 
quality is unknown at the moment of purchase. According to this argument, sellers will 
extend more trade credit when selling products where quality is indefinite at a prior 
moment and the purchase is not frequent. On the contrary, sellers will extend less trade 
credit when trading perishable items where acquisition is very frequent. 
Many financial scholars have studied trade credit from this point of view (see, for 
instance, Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long et al, 1993; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Wei and Zee, 
1997; Pike et al., 2005). In summary, the main results of these authors are as follows. i) 
Small firms tend to offer more trade credit than large firms, since small firms still have to 
establish their reputation about product quality. ii) Firms with longer production cycles 
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prolong their collection period, since they produce high-quality goods. iii) Firms selling 
products whose quality is difficult to measure extend more trade credit because customers 
must have enough time to assess quality. iv) Sellers of low quality goods may try to pass 
them off as high-quality goods. In this case, as the cost of extending trade credit increases, 
these firms will have less incentive to cheat on the information on quality. 
II.2.5. What do these theories not explain? 
 
Although many theories have attempted, in different ways, to explain the existence of 
trade credit, they cannot provide a complete explanation of the topic. While some of the 
models are more consistent with the case of certain industries or categories of products, 
others work better in a financially constrained environment. According to Frank and 
Maksimovic (1998) “the existing theories show effects that may be important in specific 
circumstances, but they do not capture what seems to be central for explaining the wide-
spread use of trade credit and the empirical patterns of its use”. Let us check theory by 
theory and identify some inconsistencies or situations that are not very well explained. 
The tax theory suggests that firms in high tax brackets tend to offer credit to those in 
low tax brackets. Some research studies have found empirical evidence to support this, but 
this explanation does not seem to be enough since it cannot explain trade credit between 
firms situated in the same tax bracket. 
If trade credit is an operational tool and exists to minimize transactions costs, as 
Ferris (1981) suggested, a reduction in the level of trade credit used would be expected 
since many improvements in transaction technologies have taken place. However, this 
reduction has not been observed in recent years.  
The liquidity theory supposes that credit constrained firms use more trade credit than 
those with easier access to financial intermediaries. This may be an explanation, but once 
more, it does not seem to be enough since it does not explain why financially unconstrained 
firms also use trade credit. 
The product quality theory argues that trade credit is offered to allow clients to check 
the real quality of the goods before payment, but it does not explain why firms selling some 
products and services do not offer credit at all; some firms even require clients to pay in 
advance. 
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II.3. An agency model explaining trade credit policy 
 
The main difference between our agency model and other models that attempt to 
explain trade credit by assuming the existence of asymmetric information is the inclusion of 
the moral hazard phenomenon into our model. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
the agency problem could be extended to the relation between a firm and its clients. This 
agency relation is characterized by two phenomena: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection occurs when there is ex-ante asymmetric information between sellers and 
buyers. In this case, clients do not know ex-ante the characteristics and quality of the goods 
that are being acquired. As described in Section 2.4, this phenomenon has already been 
studied by other authors, but not moral hazard, which consists of the possibility of the 
contractual relationship not being carried out by the client, facilitated by the ex-post 
asymmetric information. This phenomenon has an important consequence in that it could 
lead to clients not paying for the goods bought when the payment is due, giving rise to bad 
debts. Consequently, we define a function to explain trade credit as follows: DSO=φ(ϖ,µ), 
where DSO is the day of sales outstanding, ϖ stands for the agency costs arising from the 
adverse selection phenomenon, while µ represents the agency costs caused by the moral 
hazard phenomenon. According to our model, the greater the adverse selection costs the 
more trade credit provided to clients. In addition, the greater the moral hazard costs the less 
the trade credit offered to clients. Therefore, we expect ϖ to be positively related to DSO 
and µ to be negatively related. Consequently, our model explains the days of sales 
outstanding (DSO), which is measured as the natural logarithm of the accounts receivable 
divided by daily sales. 
The literature has argued that several variables should be taken into account to proxy 
the adverse selection phenomenon. First, the goods sold by technical industries need a 
significant amount of time to verify their quality level, hence a high adverse selection cost 
is associated with these goods. To classify each firm in our sample as part of the technical 
industry or not, we follow Titman and Wessels (1988), defining technical industries as 
those in SIC codes between 3400 and 3999. Other authors that have used the same 
classification include Long et al. (1993). Additionally, there are no adverse selection costs 
when buying some products which are easy to observe (perishable). Following Long et al. 
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(1993), we consider perishable products to be those sold by firms in SIC codes between 
2000 and 2199. Therefore, we have constructed the Product Quality Level variable (PQL) 
in order to measure the product quality level combining these two characteristics. We also 
base the construction of the product quality level variable, PQL, on the argument that if the 
reputation of the firm selling the product is already known, as is the case of large firms, less 
time is needed to verify the quality. Therefore, the PQL variable takes into account both the 
kind of product and the size of the firm. This variable takes higher values when the period 
needed to verify the quality of the product is longer, and vice versa3. As a result, the 
product quality level should be positively related to DSO. Second, the firm’s reputation 
considerably reduces the adverse selection costs. The firm’s reputation is proxied by the 
variable SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. The expected 
relationship between DSO and SIZE is negative. Third, Prowse (1990) argues that the 
greater the proportion of fixed assets in a firm, the smaller the asymmetric information 
problem. Following Prowse (1990), we compute the variable fixed assets, FIX, as 1-(Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets). This variable provides a measure that is inverse to the fixed assets of 
a firm; hence we expect FIX to be directly related to DSO. Fourth, the negative 
consequences of the problem of adverse selection to the buyer are mitigated by the 
supplier’s profitability. To proxy for supplier’s profitability we use the return on assets 
variable (ROA), calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
This variable is expected to be negatively correlated to DSO. Fifth, the last variable we use 
to proxy the adverse selection is the days to pay accounts payable (DPA), calculated as in 
Compustat Global Vantage as follows: accounts payable times 360 divided by the sum of 
inventories plus cost of goods sold plus depreciation and amortization minus the previous 
value for inventories minus depreciation and amortization. This variable is entered into the 
model because high quality firms are prone to increase the trade credit offered to their 
clients, and they use this argument to require more trade credit from their suppliers. 
Therefore, the expected relation between days to pay accounts payable and DSO is positive. 
                                                 
3
 We calculate the PQL variable as follows: PQL=(30/(1+SIZE)) for technical industries, 
PQL=(0.5/(1+SIZE)) for perishable industries, and PQL=(2/(1+SIZE)) for the remaining firms. The figures 
30, 2 and 0.5 have been chosen in order to give more power to the first characteristic related to industry, as 
suggested in financial literature. However, note that the second characteristic (size) plays an important role, 
since it distributes the values within each kind of industry and provides variability to PQL, which is necessary 
when using panel data methodology. More details will be provided by the authors upon request. 
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We base our variables to proxy the moral hazard phenomenon on Oh (1976). In 
accordance with this author, the decision to change a current credit policy to a new one 
depends on whether the marginal profitability is greater than the associated marginal 
opportunity cost. Therefore, when a firm decides to extend its credit policy it is probably 
expecting a sales increase and, hence, the firm is prepared to assume new costs such as 
collection costs, bad debt losses and variable costs. Thus, the credit policy decision 
involves a tradeoff between profits from marginal sales and their marginal costs. 
According to trade credit literature, the more extensive the credit offered, the greater 
the amount of bad debt losses the seller will support. To mitigate this problem, firms are 
motivated to offer bigger cash payment discounts. Marotta (2005) argues that there is a 
strong relation between cash discounts and debt periods, specifically when creditors’ rights 
protection is more effective. These discounts must be attractive enough to convince even 
the risky buyer to pay sooner, because if they do, it may reduce the possibility of bad debt 
losses inasmuch as it restricts the amount of time available to buyers to develop more 
problems. We proxy this problem (the cost of bad debt that may arise when trade credit is 
extended) by using the bad debt provision variable (BDP). This variable is calculated as the 
Provision-other item from Compustat Global Vantage divided by total assets. 
Consequently, the expected relationship between bad debts provision and DSO is negative. 
When trade credit is extended, if the buyer does not pay, the supplier will support all 
costs generated by the sales. Therefore, the damage caused by the moral hazard problem 
will be greater the higher the percentage of variable costs of the goods sold. As a result, we 
expect that the greater the variable costs, the more rigid the credit policy will be. 
Consequently, an additional variable to proxy the extent of the moral hazard problem is the 
variable costs variable (VCO), calculated as the cost of goods sold divided by total assets. 
Therefore, a negative relationship between the variable costs and DSO is expected. 
To test the expected relation between trade credit policy and both phenomena, we 
propose an agency model incorporating all the variables that we have considered as 
characterizing the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This model would be as 
follows: 
itititittitiitit DPAROAFIXSIZEPQLBDPVCODSO εββββββββ ++++++++= 76543210           (1) 
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The explanatory variables and their expected sign according to our previous argument 
are displayed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Variables and their expected sign 
Phenomenon Variables Expected Sign 
Adverse Selection Product quality level (PQL) + 
Adverse Selection Size (SIZE) - 
Adverse Selection Return on assets (ROA) - 
Adverse Selection Fixed assets (FIX) + 
Adverse Selection Days to pay accounts payable (DPA) + 
Moral Hazard Variable costs (VCO) - 
Moral Hazard Bad debts provision (BDP) - 
This table contains all the explanatory variables entered into our agency model and their expected sign. 
 
II.4. Data and methodology 
 
We decided to restrict our sample to manufacturing firms because it is in this 
category where trade credit takes place in its habitual form. Consequently, our sample 
covers active manufacturing companies in the UK (SIC 2000 through 3999) from the 
Compustat Global Vantage database for a four-year period ending in 2002. As a result, we 
have obtained an unbalanced panel comprising 336 companies and 1,162 observations. The 
observations in our sample are industry dispersed, i.e., the sample does not appear to be 
more concentrated in any industry. Table 3 shows the distribution by industry for our 
sample. 
 
Table 3: Sample distribution by industry 
SIC Industry Number % 
20 Food and Kindred Products 98 8.43 
21 Tobacco Products 9 0.77 
22 Textile Mill Products 38 3.27 
23 
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and 
Similar Materials 
42 3.61 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 24 2.07 
26 Paper and Allied Products 38 3.27 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 92 7.92 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 131 11.27 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 8 0.69 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 44 3.79 
A trade credit explanation based on the agency theory, legal factors and credit contagion 
   23 
 
31 Leather and Leather Products 10 0.86 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 72 6.20 
33 Primary Metal Industries 32 2.75 
34 
Manufactured Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 
33 2.84 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 110 9.47 
36 
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except 
Computer Equipment 
170 14.63 
37 Transport Equipment 68 5.85 
38 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks 
103 8.86 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 40 3.44 
Total - 1,162 100.00 
This table shows the distribution by industry for the 1,162 observations. 
 
Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis and Pearson´s correlations 
are in Table 4. The days of sales outstanding (DSO) is around 70 days. Note that correlation 
coefficients are moderate and do not violate the assumption of independence between 
explanatory variables. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations 
 Mean S. Deviation Median LNDSO VCO BDP PQL SIZE FIX ROA DPA 
DSO 4.246 0.569 4.265 1.000         
VCO 0.616 0.552 0.575 -0.248 1.000        
BDP 0.018 0.054 0.002 0.316 -0.018 1.000       
PQL 2.751 3.023 0.484 0.225 0.000 -0.030 1.000      
SIZE 5.212 2.034 4.809 -0.127 -0.195 0.262 -0.424 1.000     
FIX 0.424 0.340 0.445 0.255 -0.090 0.060 0.187 0.023 1.000    
ROA 0.012 0.326 0.072 -0.173 -0.040 -0.049 -0.101 0.206 0.002 1.000   
DPA 15.393 5,323.1 0.412 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.011 1.000 
This table provides the mean, the standard deviation, the median, and the Pearson’s correlations for the 1,162 
observations. DSO denotes the natural logarithm of days of sales outstanding, VCO is the cost of goods sold 
divided by total assets, BDP stands for the bad debt provision divided by total assets, PQL denotes the 
product quality level, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, FIX is the fixed assets proportion of total 
assets, ROA stands for the return on assets, and DPA denotes the days to pay accounts payable. 
 
To test the hypotheses related to the proposed model, we use panel data methodology 
because, unlike cross-sectional analysis, it allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. 
This heterogeneity could lead us to biased results (see, for instance, Moulton, 1986, 1987). 
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Therefore, in our paper we control for heterogeneity by modelling it as an individual effect, 
ηi. Consequently our model in Equation 1 would be as follows: 
itiititittitiitit DPAROAFIXSIZEPQLBDPVCODSO νηββββββββ +++++++++= 76543210           (2) 
where νit is a random disturbance. As a result of the possible correlation between the 
individual effect and the explanatory variables, we have estimated the model by using the 
fixed effects estimator, since this estimator is unbiased even if the above-mentioned 
correlation is present. 
 
II.5. Results 
II.5.1. Estimation results of the agency model 
 
Table 5 (see column I) provides the results from estimating the model in Equation 
(2). Our findings show evidence supporting the hypothesis that the greater the adverse 
selection problem the more trade credit offered. The SIZE variable is negatively related to 
DSO, which is in agreement with the adverse selection phenomenon, related to the product 
quality guarantee argument. As a result, smaller firms, with their reputation not yet built, 
extend more trade credit to allow clients to check product quality and build their status as 
high quality firms. The FIX variable reveals additional support to the abovementioned 
hypothesis since there is a positive relationship between FIX and DSO. According to the 
construction of the variable, the greater its value, the smaller the proportion of fixed assets 
of a firm. Thus, trade relations between buyers and suppliers with a high proportion of 
fixed assets suffer from smaller problems of adverse selection, which facilitate the 
extension of trade credit. The ROA variable is negatively related to DSO. This relationship 
implies that the more firms earn, the less credit offered. These results support the product 
quality argument in that the greater the seller’s profitability the smaller the adverse 
selection problem suffered by buyers, and consequently the less trade credit required by 
them4. 
                                                 
4
 The above-mentioned variables related to the adverse selection phenomenon show the expected relationships 
with the dependent variable; however, the PQL and DPA variables are not significant. Therefore, results from 
regressions do not allow us to affirm that firms categorized as high tech producers extend more credit than 
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Table 5: Estimation results 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
BDPit 1.145* -4.326**    
 (3.54) (-2.15)    
DBDPit*BDPit  5.401*    
  (2.76)    
VCOit -0.455* -0.460*    
 (-10.89) (-11.04)    
ROAit -0.083* -0.084* -0.067* -0.047 -0.087* 
 (-2.91) (-2.95) (-2.32) (-1.57) (-2.89) 
TDit   -0.112   
   (-1.14)   
SIZEit -0.149* -0.149*  -0.037*** -0.073* 
 (-5.60) (-5.63)  (-1.66) (-2.64) 
DPAit -9.14e-07 -9.20e-07  -9.48e-07 -8.27e-07 
 (-0.87) (-0.88)  (-0.83) (-0.73) 
PQLit -0.025 -0.024   -0.018 
 (-1.41) (-1.33)   (-0.92) 
FIXit 0.275* 0.273*   0.329* 
 (4.82) (4.79)   (5.42) 
Const. 5.237* 5.250* 4.270* 4.442* 4.535* 
 (29.44) (29.62) (201.45) (37.94) (25.60) 
R2 – within 0.166 0.174 0.007 0.010 0.044 
R2 – between 0.126 0.126 0.033 0.023 0.040 
R2 – overall 0.144 0.144 0.038 0.023 0.054 
F 23.41 21.60 3.00 2.71 7.62 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of days of sales outstanding, and the details about 
the independent variables are in Table 4. The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) 
Standard error in parentheses; ii) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Regarding the moral hazard phenomenon, the regression results are partially in 
accordance with the arguments presented in Section 3. First, we have found that VCO is 
negatively related to DSO. Therefore, variable costs negatively influence the length of the 
trade credit extended, because sellers with a high level of variable costs will be more 
strongly affected in case of buyer default than those with lower levels and, consequently, 
they will extend less credit. Second, the unexpected positive coefficient for the BDP 
variable could be related to the distress situation of risky clients. Our argument to explain 
this result is that firms whose clients are considered “high risk”, i.e. those presenting high 
                                                                                                                                                     
others and that high quality firms are prone to increase the trade credit offered to their clients in order to use 
this argument to require more trade credit from their suppliers.  
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levels of BDP, should raise the cash discounts offered in order to encourage risky clients to 
pay early and thus avoid bad debts. Unfortunately, these risky clients cannot make use of 
the discounts offered probably because of their distress situation and then they pay the total 
value on the net date. Note that this argument is similar to that provided by Fazzari et al. 
(2000) to explain the very different results obtained by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) when 
using a subsample of those firms facing a distress situation in the sample corresponding to 
the Fazzari et al. (1988) seminar paper. Additionally, Pindado et al. (2006) show that when 
firms face a distress situation they lose their normal patterns of behavior. Our argument 
also complements Marotta’s (2005), who argues that the effectiveness of the decision to 
offer cash discounts in order to diminish credit periods will depend on the existence of 
penalties for ex post delays and on the extent to which they are enforced. We add that the 
success of this decision will also depend on the financial situation of the client.  
To distinguish between the firms whose clients are distressed firms from the others, 
we have constructed a dummy variable, DBDP, that takes the value of 1 if the bad debt 
provision of the firm is higher than the mean and zero otherwise. We have then interacted 
this dummy variable with the BDP variable and incorporated this term into the model. 
Therefore, the new model would be as follows: 
itiitittitiititit DPAROAFIXSIZEPQLBDPDBDPVCODSO νηβββββγβββ ++++++++++= 765431210 )(           (3) 
This new model, whose results are provided in Table 5 (see column II), allows us to 
test the negative relation expected between trade credit and moral hazard, controlling for 
the distress situation of the clients. Regarding the BDP variable, the results indicate two 
different facts. First, when the firm has a bad debt provision higher than the mean, the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 and, consequently, the coefficient is β2+γ1. We have 
performed a linear restriction test whose null hypothesis is H0 = β2+γ1 in order to know if 
the coefficient β2+γ1=1.0772 is significantly different from zero. As the t-value is 3.3346, 
we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero. This result supports our explanation that when clients present a very high level 
of risk, seller’s efforts to diminish the average collection period are never enough and, in 
this case, a positive relation between trade credit and bad debt provision arises. Second, 
when the firm has a bad debt provision lower than the mean, the dummy variable takes the 
value of zero and the coefficient is β2 = -4.3698. Therefore, when controlling for the 
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distress situation the bad debt provision is negatively related to DSO. This result added to 
the negative relationship found between the variable costs and DSO supports that the 
greater the moral hazard problem, the less trade credit offered. 
Note that the results provided in column II show the same results on the adverse 
selection phenomenon as those commented above. As a result, we conclude that trade credit 
policy is explained by a trade-off between the adverse selection and moral hazard 
phenomena. Therefore, these findings support our model based on agency theory. 
 
II.5.2. Estimation results of the traditional models 
 
As a robustness check for our model, we test the alternative models described in 
financial literature. The results show that our model works better in explaining trade credit 
policy than the traditional models. Specifically, the results do not support the tax, liquidity 
and transactions costs theories. Furthermore, the results only partially support the product 
quality theory. 
To test the tax argument, we use the total debt variable, TD5. The idea behind this 
theory is as follows: if sellers have a high level of debt, they are less likely to obtain 
another loan with tax deductible interest which would reduce the cost of borrowing. 
Therefore, we expect the total debt variable to be negatively related to DSO. This model 
also includes profitability (ROA) as an independent variable, since the interest cannot be 
tax deductible if the seller does not obtain positive earnings before taxes. Our findings (see 
column III of Table 5) show that only the ROA variable is significant. Therefore, this result 
does not support the tax theory, showing that trade credit policy cannot be explained by tax 
motives. 
According to the liquidity theory, the DSO is expected to be directly related to the 
size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA) variables, and inversely related to the days to pay 
accounts payable variable (DPA). As can be seen in column IV of Table 5, our findings do 
not support the liquidity theory, since the ROA and DPA variables show non-significant 
coefficients and SIZE is negatively related to the dependent variable. 
                                                 
5
 This variable is calculated as the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of total 
assets. 
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To test the operational argument of transactions costs theory, we regress the DSO 
using as the explanatory variable SDS (standard deviation of sales). As this variable is 
constructed by using the standard deviation of total revenue over the four-year period 
ending in 2002, we only have cross-sectional data. Therefore, we use the ordinary least 
squares method to estimate the model, since it was not possible to use panel data 
methodology. This theory predicts that DSO is positively related to SDS. The results 
(provided by the authors upon request) reveal that the coefficient of the variable SDS is not 
significant; hence the operational argument of the transactions costs theory is not 
supported. 
The product quality theory is tested by using the same explanatory variables 
incorporated in the agency model to proxy the adverse selection phenomenon. The results 
(see column V of Table 5) are similar, in terms of sign and significance of coefficients, to 
those obtained when testing our agency model for the variables capturing the adverse 
selection phenomenon.  
Furthermore, the specification tests could also help us to compare our agency model 
with the traditional model. Except for the product quality model, the F statistic shows that 
the null hypothesis that all variables are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected; therefore 
these models do not offer a good explanation of the trade credit policy. Although the F 
statistic for the product quality model allows us to reject the null hypothesis, the 
explanatory power of this model is lower than that of our agency model, as can be seen if 
we compare the values for the R2 between displayed in Table 5. Note that by using panel 
data methodology the R2 between is the directly relevant measure of goodness of fit. This 
greater explanatory power is due to the fact that the product quality model does not include 
the moral hazard phenomenon, thus providing a limited explanation of trade credit policy, 
since the risk of buyers not paying when payment is due is crucial when making trade credit 
decisions. 
 
II.6. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes an agency model to explain trade credit offered by firms. This 
model is based on the two phenomena (adverse selection and moral hazard) arising from 
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the agency relation between sellers and buyers. According to our argument, firms make 
their decisions related to trade credit by taking into account the trade-off between adverse 
selection (since clients do not know the characteristics and quality of the goods bought) and 
moral hazard (in that the buyer might not pay for the goods bought when the payment is 
due).  
Our findings strongly support our model to explain trade credit policy. Additionally, 
our results show that our model works better at explaining trade credit policy than the 
traditional models. In fact, our results do not support the tax, liquidity and transactions 
costs theories, while the product quality theory is only partially supported. Therefore, a 
model accounting for both adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena is needed in 
order to properly explain how firms make their trade credit decisions. First, the adverse 
selection phenomenon explains why sellers need to offer trade credit to buyers in order to 
mitigate the ex-ante asymmetric information caused by the unknown characteristics and 
quality of the goods bought. Therefore, smaller firms, those with a smaller proportion of 
fixed assets, and those that are less profitable tend to extend more trade credit in order to 
mitigate the adverse selection problem. Second, the moral hazard phenomenon explains 
why some firms do not offer trade credit in order to avoid the negative consequences 
arising when the clients do not pay for the goods bought. Therefore, the higher the 
proportion of variable costs the less trade credit offered since the consequences of the moral 
hazard phenomenon would be more negative. Additionally, the higher percentage of bad 
debts a firm has, the less trade credit offered in order to encourage their clients to pay when 
payment is due.  
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CHAPTER III – TRADE CREDIT, CREDITOR 
PROTECTION AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: 
EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE 
 
 
III.1. Introduction 
 
Many previous studies have investigated the use and the offer of trade credit by firms. 
In most of these papers, scholars were concerned only with firm specific determinants and 
rarely tried to find cross country differences that may cause variations in trade credit 
policies among firms located in different countries. 
Although some works have recently studied trade credit using samples composed of 
firms from different countries (see, for instance, Wei and Zee, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003; Delannay and Weill, 2004; Pike et al., 2005; 
and Horen, 2005), none of them have attended to the specific importance of the creditor 
protection level as a factor that may mitigate supplier risk in extending trade credit. In 
addition, as far as we know, the quality of the accounting standards of a country have/has 
not been studied as a characteristic that diminishes information asymmetries between 
suppliers and their clients. 
In this vein, Wei and Zee (1997) test for the validity of the product quality theory for 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001), using a large sample of firms from 39 countries, find that the 
development of a country’s banking system and legal infrastructure predicts the use of trade 
credit. Fisman and Love (2003) study the relation between industry growth, the 
development of financial intermediaries and trade credit. However, their work focuses on 
industry growth instead of on trade credit policies. Additionally, Delannay and Weill 
(2004) study the determinants of trade credit and trade debt for a large sample of firms from 
nine Central and Eastern European Countries. Their results did not show generalized 
determinants of trade credit in all transition countries.  Recently, Pike et al. (2005) analyze, 
for US, UK and Australian firms, whether the twin objectives of reducing information 
asymmetries and discriminatory pricing are relevant to the definitions of trade credit terms. 
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In another relevant paper, Horen (2005) tests for the use of trade credit as a competitiveness 
tool using a sample of firms from 42 developing countries. 
Although the relation between legal framework and trade credit has been little 
studied, the association between legal infrastructure and bank credit has been deeply 
explored by scholars (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1998; Galindo and Micco, 2007; 
Djankov et al., 2007 and, Safavian and Sharma, 2007). These studies have concentrated on 
bank credit, usually measured by private credit/GDP, and usually, but not always, analyzing 
country level data. However, the association between this legal infrastructure and trade 
credit is still little explored. 
Differences in countries’ legal systems can be proxied by features such as creditors’ 
rights, investors’ rights, laws enforcement, accounting standards, etc. Creditor protection 
varies strongly around the world. According to La Porta et al. (1998) common-law 
countries offer creditors the strongest legal protection against managers, followed by 
countries from German-civil-law tradition and Scandinavian tradition. French-civil-law 
countries offer creditors the weakest protection. The level of creditors’ legal protection is 
determinant for the size of credit markets (see, Galindo and Micco, 2007), since the 
borrowing risk increases in countries where creditor protection is low. Generalizing this 
proposition, it can be affirmed that the level of creditors’ legal protection will also affect 
the risk involved in extending trade credit to a client. 
As occurs in the case of creditor rights, the quality of the accounting standards varies 
substantially among countries. According to La Porta et al. (1998), Scandinavian-civil-law 
countries show the strongest accounting system quality, followed by countries from 
common-law tradition and German-civil-law countries. The weakest quality of accounting 
is found in those countries from the French-civil-law family. 
This article focuses on explaining trade credit by using an agency model on a large 
sample of companies and also testing for the influence of the level of creditor protection 
and the quality of accounting standards on trade credit policies. According to the model, 
trade credit policies are defined by a trade-off between two agency costs, adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Our sample comprises firms from 13 developed and developing 
countries with distinct levels of financial system development, creditor protection and 
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accounting standards. The size and the heterogeneity of our sample allow us to check for 
the validity of the agency model in the trade credit explanation around the world. 
This paper presents three main contributions. First, the sample includes firms from 
developed and developing countries, from different legal systems, and consequently 
presenting diverse levels of quality in their creditor protection and accounting systems. As a 
consequence, this sample allows us to analyse the influence of both factors on the moral 
hazard phenomenon.  Second, we improve the proxy variable for the moral hazard 
phenomenon in comparison to previous studies by using the “provision for bad debts” data 
available in Worldscope. Third, we estimate the models using the panel data methodology 
(GMM system) which, unlike cross-sectional analysis, allows us to control for individual 
heterogeneity and consequently eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results. 
Our results indicate that there is a positive relationship between adverse selection and 
trade credit extended. In other words, in the presence of information asymmetry, sellers will 
offer trade credit to provide buyers with time to check the real quality of the products 
before paying for them. We also find a negative relationship between moral hazard and 
trade credit extended. This result indicates that, in the presence of information asymmetry, 
suppliers will reduce the trade credit offer when the risk of buyers’ not carrying out the 
payment when it is due increases. Furthermore, our results also provide empirical evidence 
of a mitigation effect of the level of creditor protection and accounting standards on the 
moral hazard phenomenon. Therefore, the negative relationship between moral hazard and 
trade credit extended will be mitigated in firms from countries of high level of creditor 
protection or high quality in their accounting standards.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the trade 
credit differences across countries. The agency problem in a trade credit relationship, the 
influence of the level of creditor protection and the quality of the accounting system in the 
offer of trade credit and hypotheses are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data 
and the empirical strategy, while the results are shown in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. 
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III.2. Trade credit differences across countries 
 
In the last three decades many studies have been carried out to investigate trade 
credit. Although its use can differ significantly depending on where firms are located, 
strangely, researchers have normally ignored these cross-country differences. Except for 
some studies (see, for instance, Wei and Zee, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001; Fisman and Love, 2003; Delannay and Weill, 2004; Pike et al., 2005 and; Horen, 
2005), most of the literature has only sought the reasons for the differences in trade credit 
policies between firms by using a firm’s specific and internal characteristics, such as 
differences in firm access to funds (see Brick and Fung, 1984 for tax reasons; or Schwartz, 
1974, for financial reasons), in transaction costs (Ferris, 1981; Emery, 1987) or in product 
quality (Smith, 1987; Emery and Nayar, 1998). 
Some of these theories can explain trade credit in a few specific situations, but are not 
able to explain why there are significant differences in trade credit policies among firms 
located in different countries. According to the harmonized account data base, BACH,6 for 
the year 2000 (see Bardes, 2002 and Marotta, 2005), Italy is the country that has the highest 
level of accounts payable and receivable, followed by France and Spain, while Germany 
has the lowest. Wei and Zee (1997), using the Disclosure Worldscope database, make an 
international comparison of the use of trade credit among Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States and again find that Germany shows the lowest levels. 
An interesting research study that has found some empirical evidence of cross-
country variations in trade credit used by firms is the one by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001). In this paper the authors investigate data from 39 countries and also 
find Italy as the largest trade credit user. However, what does variation really mean and 
why does it exist? Their main assumption is that trade credit depends on countries’ 
financial systems and legal infrastructure. 
Horen (2005), using data from 42 developing countries based on the World Bank 
Investment Climate Unit (ICU), confirms that the development of the financial system 
influences the trade credit offered by firms. Specifically, the author suggests and finds 
                                                 
6
 BACH –harmonized companies accounts database. It provides data for 11 European Countries, Japan and 
United States. 
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some empirical evidence supporting the idea that trade credit is used as a competitiveness 
tool, mainly by firms in developing countries. 
A large body of researchers have already found evidence supporting the idea that the 
legal system influences economic development, since it is an important determinant of 
financial institutions (see La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Levine, 2002; Fisman and Love, 
2003, Djankov et al., 2007). However, how does the legal system, and consequently, the 
legal framework, influence the trade credit offered by firms? According to Safavian and 
Sharma (2007) “...the extent to which the legal framework allows creditors to enforce their 
rights to collateral matters to the working of credit markets”. This reasoning also works for 
trade credit markets, that is, a legal framework that is able to mitigate the moral hazard in 
bank credit operations will also mitigate the risk of buyers’ not paying for the products 
bought when payment is due. 
Differences in countries’ legal systems include features such as creditors’ rights, 
investors’ rights, laws enforcement, accounting standards, etc. In this research we 
concentrate on two aspects of the legal system: (i) the influence of creditors’ rights on trade 
credit, since we understand that its level is an important determinant of the size of credit 
markets and, consequently, will result in more or less trade credit use by firms and; (ii) the 
role played by the level of quality of the accounting system on the trade credit extended by 
firms, since its variation across countries may result in changes in credit risk as a 
consequence of the mitigation of information asymmetries. 
 
III.3. Theory and hypothesis 
 
In order to find out the determinants of a firm’s trade credit policy and the variation in 
the amount of trade credit use among firms from different countries, we propose a model 
supported by two different dimensions. 
 
III.3.1. The first dimension: the agency problem 
 
The first dimension includes some firm and product characteristics that explain the 
differences in trade credit policy among firms trading in asymmetric information 
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conditions. In these circumstances the trade credit extended by suppliers to clients is a 
result of two phenomena, adverse selection and moral hazard. The first phenomenon has 
been proposed and supported by many research studies, such as Smith (1987), Long, Malitz 
and Ravid (1993), Lee and Stowe (1993), Emery and Nayar (1998), Wei and Zee (1997)7 
and Pike et al. (2005). Adverse selection arises when clients do not know ex-ante the 
quality of the goods they are going to buy. In this case, sellers extend trade credit to 
guarantee their buyers product quality. This point of view suggests that firms selling high 
tech products whose reputation has not been consolidated will extend trade credit to allow 
clients to check the real quality of the goods before payment. Nevertheless, when trade 
credit is extended, the risk of buyers not making the payment when it is due increases, 
giving rise to the moral hazard phenomenon. 
In other words, moral hazard and adverse selection are two phenomena that arise 
from sellers and buyers trading in conditions of asymmetric information. This trade-off 
characterizes an agency relationship between a firm and its clients, first proposed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Therefore, the two following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of adverse selection in a relationship between 
sellers and buyers, the greater the trade credit offered. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of moral hazard in a relationship between sellers 
and buyers, the less trade credit offered. 
 
III.3.2. The second dimension: countries’ specificities 
 
The second dimension refers to two country characteristics that may distinguish 
financial patterns of firms from different legal environments: differences in creditor 
protection and the quality of accounting standards. According to the following arguments, 
high levels of creditor protection may mitigate the moral hazard costs, and high quality 
accounting systems mitigate information asymmetries and, consequently, moral hazard 
costs. 
                                                 
7
 These authors find mixed evidence supporting the product quality theory. However they conclude that “the 
theory is valid at least for some countries and industries” 
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III.3.2.1. Creditor Protection 
 
Evidence found by La Porta et al. (1997), Galindo and Micco (2007) and Djankov et 
al. (2007) supports the explanation of the importance of creditor rights in credit used by 
firms. They find that the size of credit markets in countries presenting high levels of 
creditor rights is much larger than in countries presenting weaker creditor protection. 
Specifically, Levine (2002) finds that countries whose legal systems emphasize creditor 
rights and contract enforcements have better developed banks. 
Countries with lower creditor protection present a high credit risk to lenders. The 
higher this credit risk, the higher the borrowing cost for firms. Nevertheless, this cost will 
be lower in trade credit than in bank credit, since according to the transaction cost theory, 
suppliers may have cost advantages against financial intermediaries in acquisition 
information.  
This view is in agreement with Fisman and Love (2003), who pointed out that: 
“...even though weak creditor protection and imperfect information will affect both formal 
intermediaries and trade credit providers, trade creditors may mitigate these problems 
better than formal lenders...”. In this case, non-financial firms (suppliers) are cheaper 
lenders than banks.  
As explained previously, the effect of a weak creditor protection is lower in trade 
credit than in bank credit. However, it is also important in the explanation of trade credit 
policies, since the providers’ difficulty in seizing their goods when buyers file for 
reorganization and have not paid for them yet will affect the trade credit risk. Therefore, 
adding a new argument to the proposed trade-off between adverse selection and moral 
hazard, depending on the level of creditor protection in a country, the cost of the moral 
hazard can oscillate. Although trade credit is expected to be proportionally higher8 in 
countries of lower creditor protection, it is also expected that the weakness in creditor rights 
                                                 
8
 Considering that trade credit and bank credit are substitutes, we expect that in environments where creditor 
protection is low, the mix of external finance used by firms will be composed of a higher proportion of trade 
credit and a smaller proportion of bank debt when compared to firms from countries where creditor protection 
is high. In this case, trade credit is acting as a mechanism to compensate the higher cost of funds from 
financial institutions. 
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may enhance the influence of moral hazard in trade credit extended by providers which, as 
described above, is expected to be negatively related to trade credit. Therefore, creditor 
protection will act as a moderator in the moral hazard phenomenon. 
 This explanation has theoretical support in Galindo and Micco (2007), who point out 
that the low level of creditor protection becomes more relevant in the development of credit 
markets during bankruptcy. Naturally, we can broaden this reasoning to a trade credit 
relationship between firms in the case of buyers presenting a high risk of bankruptcy. Thus, 
the level of creditors’ protection will be more important to the development of trade credit 
markets along the supply chain when buyers’ risk of bankruptcy is high. 
The inclusion of the level of creditor protection as a moderator of the moral hazard 
phenomenon and consequently as an indirect determinant of the trade credit extended also 
finds support in Pindado et al. (2008), who find that insolvency codes play a crucial role in 
investment decisions. As trade credit extended by suppliers is a category of investment 
which, on the one hand, is a short term investment in accounts receivable that stimulates 
demand, and on the other hand, is an investment in a long term client relationship, creditor 
protection will influence trade credit policies at least indirectly by the mitigation of moral 
hazard. Therefore, we pose our third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The quality of creditor protection mitigates the moral hazard effects on trade 
credit policies. 
 
III.3.2.2. Accounting Standards 
 
Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers certainly influences the cost 
of the credit and its amount. The scarcity of information about a borrower’s financial 
situation or the existence of untrustworthy or precise information about them can lead 
financial intermediaries to reject credit demands or to increase their cost to compensate the 
risk. Fisman and Love (2003) find a negative relationship between the accounting standards 
in a country and credit financing, indicating that the weaker the accounting information the 
higher the risk of lending for financial intermediaries. Of course, the risk of lending 
increases for suppliers of trade credit as well, but as suggested by Petersen and Rajan 
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(1997), suppliers will have some informational advantages over formal lenders, which leads 
us to suppose that the scarcity of accounting information about borrowers is more 
significant for banks than for suppliers. 
Therefore, as in the case of creditor’s rights, the low quality of the accounting system 
will affect, with different intensity, both financial intermediaries and trade credit suppliers.  
Thus, the more information available about a borrower’s or a buyer’s financial situation, 
the cheaper the credit offered. Therefore, the quality in the accounting system will act as a 
moderator in information asymmetries and, consequently, in the moral hazard phenomenon. 
Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is as follows9. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The quality of the accounting standards mitigates the moral hazard effects on 
trade credit policies. 
 
These theoretical hypotheses can be tested by using a model represented by a function 
to explain trade credit usage by firms from different legal environments as follows: 
DSO=φ(ϖ,µ), where DSO is the day of sales outstanding, ϖ stands for the agency costs 
arising from the adverse selection phenomenon, while µ represents the agency costs caused 
by the moral hazard phenomenon. And, as posited above, DSO is directly related to ϖ and 
inversely related to µ. Additionally, the quality of creditor protection (Ω) and the quality of 
accounting standards (Ψ) have been included as factors that moderate the moral hazard 
phenomenon in trade credit.  
The graph shown in Figure 2 allows us to observe the theoretical construction 
described above. Line AB represents the adverse selection phenomenon and indicates its 
expected direct relationship with trade credit. Line CD stands for the moral hazard 
phenomenon in firms from countries of low creditor protection and low quality in 
accounting standards. Line CE represents the moral hazard phenomenon in the case of 
firms from countries of high creditor protection and high quality in accounting standards. In 
both cases, the expected relationship of moral hazard with trade credit is negative. The 
graph helps us to understand that, according to the agency model, the trade credit extended 
                                                 
9
 The percentage of customers from different countries will certainly affect this relationship, since export 
firms will trade with clients under different levels of accounting standards. 
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will be a result of a trade-off between both phenomena, as represented by points TC1 and 
TC2. Moreover, the graph shows the expected influence of the creditor protection level and 
the quality of accounting standards on the moral hazard. According to the model, in 
countries of high creditor protection or with a high quality accounting system we expect 
that the influence of moral hazard in trade credit policies will decrease. Therefore, when 
creditor protection is high, as in the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia, the moral 
hazard line presents a smoother decline as compared to countries where creditor protection 
is low, as in Mexico and France. As a consequence, the optimum trade credit level point 
will move to the right as the moral hazard becomes less important in the trade credit policy 
decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Trade-off between moral hazard and adverse selection and creditor rights/accounting system 
influence 
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Notes: 
                                            Adverse Selection 
Moral Hazard in countries of high levels of creditor protection 
or high quality in accounting standards 
Moral Hazard in countries of low levels of creditor protection 
or low quality in accounting standards 
 
 
In short, trade credit extended will be larger in the case of firms from countries where 
creditor protection is high, ceteris paribus. The same reasoning is valid for the accounting 
system, that is, the trade credit extended will be larger in the case of firms from countries 
where the quality in the accounting system is high, ceteris paribus. 
 
III.4. Data, empirical model and methodology 
 
III.4.1. Data 
 
Our original file contained data of companies from 19 different developed and 
developing countries comprising all legal families described by La Porta et al. (1998). The 
firm data level was obtained from Worldscope and we used La Porta et al. (1998) to 
complete all the information about the countries’ creditor protection and accounting 
systems. These 19 countries were selected in order to generate a heterogeneous sample of 
firms immersed in distinct levels of economic development, creditor rights and accounting 
systems. 
The sample was restricted to manufacturing firms because it is in this category where 
trade credit takes place in its usual form. We constructed a panel containing at least five 
consecutive years of information for each company. In this step, five countries were kept 
out of the sample (Argentina, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy and Pakistan), because they 
did not fulfil this requirement. We also dropped firm-year data with missing values for our 
crucial variables. As a result, our sample covers active manufacturing companies (SIC 2000 
through 3999) from 1990 to 2003. Therefore, we obtained an unbalanced panel comprising 
1,213 companies and 6,508 observations from 13 countries. 
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III.4.2. Empirical Model 
 
Since the aim of this work is to analyze the determinants of trade credit extended, we 
use two different proxies to measure this variable: the days of sales outstanding (DSO), 
measured by the natural logarithm of accounting receivable days10, available in Woldscope, 
and the ratio of trade receivables to total assets (TRC). The first is a proxy for how long 
trade credit is extended and the last is a proxy for the amount of trade credit extended.  
Now, we explain each right-side variable to measure for both phenomena, adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The literature has argued that the adverse selection 
phenomenon can be proxied by several variables, one of them being reputation. Reputation 
reduces adverse selection costs and can be proxied by SIZE, as measured by the number of 
employees in the company. SIZE is expected to be negatively related to DSO.  
Another proxy for firm reputation and, consequently, for the adverse selection 
phenomenon, is a firm’s fixed assets, since the larger they are, the smaller the asymmetric 
information in a trade relationship. Therefore, to measure the suppliers’ fixed assets we use 
FIX, calculated as 1-(Fixed Assets/Total Assets), that is, the inverse of firm’s fixed assets. 
For this variable we expected a positive relationship with DSO. 
As the negative consequences of adverse selection can be mitigated by the supplier’s 
profitability, the variable ROA, calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets, is used to proxy for firms’ profitability.  This variable is expected to be 
negatively correlated to DSO. 
As Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) point out, buyers of high-tech products require a 
longer time period to verify quality and buyers of perishable products need only a short 
time to resolve quality uncertainty. These differences in the time requirements for verifying 
the quality of the products exist because of the variation in the presence of adverse 
selection costs associated with each type of product. Therefore, we follow Bastos and 
Pindado (2007) in the construction of the Product Quality Level variable (PQL)11. This 
                                                 
10
 Accounts receivable days are available in Worldscope calculated as follows: 360 / (Revenues / (Current 
Year's Receivables + Last Year's Receivables / 2)) 
11
 We calculate the PQL variable as follows: PQL=(30/(1+Natural Logarithm of Total Assets)) for technical 
industries, PQL=(0.5/(1+ Natural Logarithm of Total Assets)) for perishable industries, and PQL=(3/(1+ 
Natural Logarithm of Total Assets)) for the remaining firms. The figures 30, 3 and 0.5 have been chosen in 
order to give more power to the first characteristic related to industry, as suggested in financial literature. 
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variable takes higher values when the period needed to verify the quality of the product is 
longer, and vice versa. As a result, the product quality level should be positively related to 
DSO 
The last variable used to proxy adverse selection is the natural logarithm of days to 
pay accounts payable (DPA), calculated as accounts payable times 360 divided by the cost 
of goods sold. This variable is entered into the model because high quality firms are prone 
to increasing the trade credit offered to their clients, and they use this argument to require 
more trade credit from their suppliers. Therefore, the expected relation between days to pay 
accounts payable and DSO is positive. 
The bad debts provision divided by the net trade receivables (BDP) is used to proxy 
for the risk of buyers not making the payment when it is due. This measure is used since it 
represents the main risk for suppliers extending trade credit. The expected relationship 
between bad debts provision and DSO is negative. Equation 1 represents our model 
including only those variables described above that are used to proxy for the adverse 
selection and the moral hazard phenomena, that is, the agency problem. 
DSOit = β0 + β 1BDPit + β 2PQLit + β3SIZEit + β4FIXit + β5ROAit + β6DPAit + εit                              (1) 
where εit is the random disturbance. 
To measure the creditor protection in each country of our sample, the index of La 
Porta et al. (1998) is used. This index is composed of 4 different aspects of creditor 
protection in bankruptcy situations: (i)whether restrictions are needed, such as creditor 
consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (ii) whether secured creditors are able to 
seize their collateral after a debtor appeal for reorganization is approved (no automatic stay 
or asset freeze); (iii) whether a secured creditor has preference in receiving money from the 
liquidation of a bankrupt firm; (iv) whether during reorganization the head of the firm is an 
administrator appointed by the court and not the manager. For this index, 0 (zero) 
represents the weakest creditor protection and 4 (four) corresponds to the strongest.  
According to Pindado et al. (2008), these four aspects mentioned above are 
determinants of the risk borne by bondholders and can increase the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                                                     
However, note that the second characteristic (Natural Logarithm of Total Assets) plays an important role, 
since it distributes the values within each kind of industry and provides variability to PQL, which is necessary 
when using the panel data methodology. More details will be provided by the authors upon request. 
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underinvestment. As explained in Section 3, trade credit extended is also an investment and 
its level will also be affected by this measure of creditor protection. Therefore, based on 
this index we construct a dummy variable by splitting our sample into two groups, one 
taking the value of zero, containing firms from countries of low levels of creditor 
protection, that is, with a index value smaller than two and another, taking the value of one, 
containing firms with high levels of creditor protection, that is,  with an index value equal 
to or greater than two. Hereafter, we refer to this measure as the Creditors’ Rights Dummy 
(CRD). 
To proxy for the quality of a country’s accounting system we used the accounting 
standard index (AS), also based on La Porta et al. (1998). This measure is an index 
checking for the inclusion or the omission of 90 items in annual reports of companies from 
several countries. We again constructed a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
firms from countries where the quality of the accounting standards are above average and 
zero otherwise, that is, countries of high and low quality accounting systems. Hereafter, we 
refer to this measure as the accounting standard dummy (ASD). Equation 2 represents our 
model, including, for the moral hazard phenomenon, an interaction dummy variable (INTi) 
that measures the level of a country’s creditor protection or the level of a country’s quality 
in accounting standards as described above. 
DSOit = β0 + BDPit (β 1 +λINTi) + β 2PQLit + β3SIZEit + β4FIXit + β5ROAit + β6DPAit + εit              (2) 
where INTi represents the country specificity interaction in the moral hazard phenomenon 
as the creditors’ rights index (CR) or the quality of the accounting system (AS) and εit is a 
random disturbance. 
 
III.4.3. Methodology 
 
We estimate the proposed model by using panel data methodology for two main 
reasons. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, it allows us to control for individual 
heterogeneity. This heterogeneity could lead to biased results (see, for instance, Moulton, 
1986, 1987). Therefore, in our paper we control for heterogeneity by modelling it as an 
individual effect, ηi. Consequently, the error term in our models, it, has been split into four 
components. First, the firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt, which is time specific effects and 
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allows us to control for some macroeconomic influences on the trade credit decision. Third, 
as the estimation of our model uses data from several countries, we included country 
dummy variables, ci. Finally, νit is the random disturbance. 
  The second reason for using panel data methodology is because endogeneity may be 
a problem in our model. Particularly, firms that receive trade credit from their suppliers use 
this source of finance to extend credit to their buyers. However, the inverse direction of this 
relationship may also occur, since high quality suppliers that extend trade credit to their 
clients use this argument to require more credit from their suppliers. A similar problem also 
occurs between days of sales outstanding and the provision for bad debts, since the latter is 
a measure for buyers’ moral hazard and when trade credit is extended bad debts are likely 
to increase. To control for this problem we use all the right-hand-side variables in the 
model lagged from t-1 to t-2 as instruments for the equations in differences. Therefore, our 
model in Equation 1 and 2 would be, respectively, as follows: 
DSOit = β0 + β 1BDPit + β 2PQLit + β3SIZEit + β4FIXit + β5ROAit + β6DPAit + ηi + dt + ci + νit         (3) 
DSOit = β0 + BDPit (β 1 +λINTi) + β 2PQLit + β3SIZEit + β4FIXit + β5ROAit + β6DPAit + ηi + dt + ci + νit        (4) 
where ηi is an individual effect, dt is the time specific effect, ci are countries’ dummy 
variables and νit is the random disturbance. 
With the aim of checking for the potential misspecification of the models, we also test 
the joint significance of the reported coefficient by running three Wald tests, where z1 is a 
test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance 
of the time dummies; and z3 is a test of the joint significance of the country dummies. 
Additionally, we use the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test 
the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. We also use the m2 
statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), in order to test for lack of second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residual. All these statistics are shown joined with 
the estimation results. 
 
III.5. Results 
 
In this section we first present the distribution of our sample by industry, by the level 
of creditor protection and by the level of quality in accounting standards, the descriptive 
statistics and Pearson’s correlation for all variables included in our model. We then 
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estimate the agency model without the inclusion of the countries’ specificities as an 
interaction term. Finally, we test for the importance of the creditor protection level and the 
accounting standards as a factor that moderates the effect of buyers’ risk of default on the 
trade credit offer by suppliers. 
 
III.5.1. Descriptive Statistics and preliminary results 
 
The structure of the sample by number of companies and number of observations per 
level of creditor protection and per level of the quality in accounting standards are provided 
in Table 6. Note that our sample is balanced between what we consider “high” and “low” 
levels of creditor protection and “high” and “low” levels of quality in accounting standards. 
  
Table 6: Structure of the sample according to creditor protection and accounting standards 
Panel A: Number of companies and observations per level of creditor Protection 
CR Nº of Companies Nº of Observations % of Total 
0 193 1,435 22.05 
1 293 1,411 21.68 LOW LEVEL (43,73) 
2 645 3,291 50.57 
3 24 130 2.00 
4 58 241 3.70 
HIGH LEVEL (56,27) 
Total 1,213 6,508 100.00 
Panel B: Number of companies and observations per level of quality in the 
accounting standards 
AS Nº of Companies Nº of Observations % of Total 
36 19 122 1.88 
54 6 27 0.41 
60 2 9 0.14 
62 24 130 2.00 
64 32 273 4.19 
65 606 2,984 45.85 
LOW LEVEL (54,46) 
 
69 191 1,426 21.91 
71 268 1,262 19.40 
74 4 19 0.29 
76 34 138 2.12 
78 24 103 1.58 
83 3 15 0.23 
HIGH LEVEL (45,52) 
Total 1,213 6,508 100.00 
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Table 7 presents all the countries included in our sample and their respective level of 
creditor protection and accounting system. Note that the countries are dispersed in their 
levels of creditor protection and accounting system. 
 
Table 7: Creditors’ rights index and accounting standards index for all countries in the sample 
Countries CR AS 
Civil Law (French-origin) 
France 0 69 
Spain 2 64 
Portugal 1 36 
Brazil 1 54 
Mexico 0 60 
Civil Law (German-origin) 
Germany 3 62 
Japan 2 65 
Civil Law (Scandinavian-origin) 
Norway 2 74 
Sweden 2 83 
Common Law (English-origin) 
UK 4 78 
US 1 71 
Singapore 4 78 
Malaysia 4 76 
 
The observations in our sample are industry dispersed, i.e., the sample does not 
appear to be more concentrated in any industry. Table 8 shows the distribution by industry 
for our sample. 
 
Table 8: Sample distribution by industry 
SIC Industry Number % 
20 Food and Kindred Products 554 8.517 
21 Tobacco Products 9 0.14 
22 Textile Mill Products 156 2.40 
23 
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and Similar 
Materials 
169 2.60 
24 Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 71 1.09 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 94 1.44 
26 Paper and Allied Products 185 2.84 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 128 1.97 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 848 13.03 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 71 1.09 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 247 3.80 
31 Leather and Leather Products 45 0.69 
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32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 237 3.64 
33 Primary Metal Industries 412 6.33 
34 
Manufactured Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 
353 5.42 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 912 14.01 
36 
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except 
Computer Equipment 
930 14.29 
37 Transport Equipment 516 7.93 
38 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks 
396 6.08 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 175 2.69 
Total 6,508 100.00 
This table shows the distribution by industry for the 6,508 observations. 
 
Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis and Pearson’s correlations 
are shown in Table 9. The days of sales outstanding is around 95 days. Note that correlation 
coefficients are moderate and do not violate the assumption of independence between 
explanatory variables. Not surprisingly, all dependent variables included in the model 
present the expected relation with DSO. The positive signs of PQL and FIX and the 
negative signs of SIZE and ROA suggest that smaller and less profitable firms producing 
high quality products and presenting a small proportion of fixed assets related to total assets 
tend to offer more trade credit to their clients. These outcomes support the idea that in 
asymmetric information environments there is a positive influence of adverse selection on 
the trade credit offered by sellers. The results for DPA also support the adverse selection 
phenomenon in the trade credit extended by providers. Regarding the BDP variable, the 
negative sign of the relationship with DSO was as expected by the proposed model. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations 
 Mean S. Deviation Median DSO BDP PQL SIZE FIX ROA DPA 
DSO 4.485    0.414 4.533 1.000       
BDP 0.082    1.071          0.020  -0.009 1.000      
PQL 1.165    1.000 1.557 0.162 0.021 1.000     
SIZE 7.906    1.709 7.648 -0.182 -0.021 -0.108 1.000    
FIX 0.707    0.138 0.716 0.169 0.013 0.338 -0.141 1.000   
ROA 0.048     0.105 0.043 -0.204 0.024 -0.083 0.106 0.048 1.000  
DPA 4.183 0.531 4.252 0.452 -0.059 0.060 0.046 0.038 -0.162 1.000 
This table provides the mean, the standard deviation, the median, and the Pearson’s correlations for the 6,508 
observations. DSO denotes the natural logarithm of days of sales outstanding, BDP stands for the second 
power of bad debt provision divided by total assets, PQL denotes the product quality level, SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees of the firm, FIX is the fixed assets proportion of total assets, ROA 
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stands for earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, and DPA denotes the natural logarithm of 
days to pay accounts payable. 
 
We also test for the difference in days of sales outstanding between firms from 
countries of high and low levels of creditor protection. The same test was run for firms 
from countries of high and low quality accounting systems. Results in Table 10 show that 
firms from countries where creditor protection is high extend more trade credit than those 
located in countries where creditor protection is low. These outcomes are evidence in 
favour of the idea that lower levels of creditor rights may diminish not only the amount of 
bank credit available but also the trade credit offered by suppliers. These results are 
consistent with those found by Fisman and Love (2003), Galindo and Mico (2005) and 
Safavian and Sharma (2007). 
 
Table 10: Test of independent samples 
Variables High CRa Low CRb T-Statistic of Difference  
Days of Sales 
Outstanding 104.0658 85.52565 -20.4248* 
Variables High ASc Low ASd T-Statistic of Difference  
Days of Sales 
Outstanding 86.14715 104.1583 19.8885* 
* Significant at the 0.01 level.  
a High CR is defined as CR equal or greater than 2. 
b Low CR is defined as CR index less than  2. 
c High AS is defined as AS index greater than average (66.85). 
d Low AS is defined as AS index under than average (66.85). 
 
Preliminary results for differences in DSO between firms from countries of different 
accounting systems show that firms from countries presenting high quality in their 
accounting standards extend less trade credit than those from countries where the 
accounting standards present low levels of quality. This result may occur because financial 
reports are likely to be more important for banks, since suppliers have informational 
advantages in acquisition information about buyers’ creditworthiness. Although we 
understand that high quality in the accounting standards is very important for the credit 
decision in the bank sector, we also consider that a high quality accounting system also 
favours a trade credit decision and should, at least, mitigate the moral hazard costs present 
in a trade relationship. 
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III.5.2. Results for the agency model 
 
The results of the GMM estimation of our agency model are provided in Column I of 
Table 11. Coefficients for all variables that are proxies for adverse selection present the 
expected sign and, except for DPA, are significant at the 1% level. The variable ROA is 
negatively related to DSO, indicating that profitable firms tend to offer a shorter period of 
credit. The variable SIZE is negatively related to DSO, giving support to the argument that 
large and well-established firms tend to offer less credit to their clients. PQL is positively 
related to DSO, supporting that firms producing high quality products tend to offer more 
credit to their clients to allow them to assess the quality of goods before payment. FIX is 
positively related to DSO, supporting that firms with a large proportion of fixed assets tend 
to extend less credit to clients since tangible assets mitigate information asymmetries. All 
these results yield strong evidence in favour of a positive relationship between adverse 
selection and trade credit extended and consequently support Hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 11: Estimations results 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) 
DSOit-1 0.8070182* 0.8065625* 0.7994892* 
 (0.0027917) (0.0017489) (0.0014077) 
BDPit -0.0021076* -0.0082181* -0.0854915* 
 (0.0004063) (0.0003119) (0.0012036) 
CRDit*BDPit - 0.006841* - 
 - (0.0005106) - 
ASD*BDP - - 0.0837446* 
 - - (0.001247) 
ROAit -0.2158091* -0.2158615* -0.2212084* 
 (0.0090072) (0.0044247) (0.0054363) 
SIZEit -0.0069287* -0.0110325* -0.0086201* 
 (0.0009708) (0.0004525) (0.0005186) 
DPAit 0.0002108 0.0011698 0.0010408 
 (0.0018253) (0.0008244) (0.0011731) 
PQLit 0.0098456* 0.0076157* 0.010218* 
 (0.0009052) (0.0003244) (0.0003301) 
FIXit 0.178817* 0.1777168* 0.1575226* 
 (0.0097991) (0.0043614) (0.0066489) 
Const. 1.038491* 1.066129* 1.091373* 
 (0.0211224) (0.0168437) (0.0161428) 
T - -3.5538856 -4.8933783 
z1 37214.63 (7) 1.2e+05 (8) 1.3e+05 (8) 
z2 496.07 (11) 1212.60 (11) 1354.63 (11) 
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z3 337.10 (13) 538.81 (13) 702.61 (13) 
M1 -8.32 -8.32 -8.30 
M2 -1.93 -1.95 -1.93 
Hansen 416.72 (274) 446.22 (307) 444.90 (309) 
The table presents parameter estimates from panel GMM regressions of Days of Sales Outstanding on 
several different specifications. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of days of sales outstanding, 
and the details about the independent variables are in Table 9. The rest of the information needed to read this 
table is: i) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses; ii) *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under 
the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2, z3 are the Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 
under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i 
using residual in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; vi) 
Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
 
The results of the estimation also provide empirical evidence in favour of a negative 
relationship between the moral hazard phenomenon and the trade credit extended. The 
coefficient for the BDP variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates 
that suppliers tend to tighten terms of credit when they notice an increase in the possibility 
of buyers’ default. Therefore, we can confirm Hypothesis 2. 
The results described here support Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that: (i) suppliers tend to 
offer more credit when they are not well known by the clients, such as those which are 
smaller, less profitable and have a small proportion of fixed assets; and (ii) suppliers will 
reduce the trade credit offered when the risk of their clients increases. In this case, suppliers 
will try to mitigate the moral hazard cost by shortening the trade credit period of its clients.  
Finally, all the results together highlight the validity of the agency model in 
explaining trade credit policies adopted by firms around the world. This agency model is 
based on the proposition of Jensen and Meckling (1976) in which two phenomena arise 
from the relationship between a firm and its clients, in asymmetric information conditions: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is an agency cost that emerges when clients 
do not know ex-ante the quality of the goods that are being acquired and therefore require a 
period to verify product quality before payment. The latter is an agency cost that arises 
when sellers do not know ex-ante the creditworthiness of their clients and therefore reduce 
the trade credit extended. 
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III.5.3. The moderating role of creditors’ rights 
 
To find out whether trade credit offered by firms is in any way influenced by a 
country’s level of creditor protection, we again run the model but including an interaction 
effect on the BDP variable (see Equation 4). With this aim, as explained in Section 4, we 
construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the creditors’ rights index is equal 
to or greater than 2 and zero otherwise. We therefore extend the agency model by 
interacting the creditors’ rights index obtained in La Porta et al. (1998) and here 
transformed into a dummy, with the provision for bad debts (BDP). Column II of Table 11 
gives the results.  
All the variables used to proxy for the adverse selection and the moral hazard 
phenomena show the same results as in the previous model. Specifically, the coefficients 
for ROA, SIZE, PQL and FIX still significant and present the same sign of the basic model, 
again giving support to Hypothesis 1. The result for the variable BDP, which in the basic 
model presented an expected negative relation with DSO, again supports Hypothesis 2, 
since its coefficient is still significant in this extended model. Overall, this evidence 
provides a robustness check for our results. 
 The results for the influence of the level of creditor protection on moral hazard point to 
two different facts. First, when the creditor protection of a country is high, the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and, consequently, the coefficient is β2+γ1. We have performed 
a linear restriction test whose null hypothesis is H0:β1+γ1 = 0 in order to know if the 
coefficient β1+γ1= -0.0013771 is significantly different from zero. As the t-value is –3.55, 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. This result supports 
our explanation that in countries where credit protection is high the moral hazard effect is 
mitigated, and, in this case, the trade-off existing in the trade credit policy decision will tilt 
in favour of the adverse selection that will predominate since clients’ risk importance will 
diminish for trade credit policy makers. Second, when a country’s creditor protection is 
low, the dummy variable takes the value of zero and the coefficient is β1 = -0.0082181, 
indicating that in these countries the clients’ risk will represent a very heavy weight in the 
suppliers’ decision of how long trade credit should be extended. 
A trade credit explanation based on the agency theory, legal factors and credit contagion 
   52 
 
Therefore, we can confirm that creditor rights act to mitigate the negative effect of the 
moral hazard phenomenon on credit extended, thus giving support to our Hypothesis 3. As 
we theorized in Section 3, high levels of creditor’s rights alleviate the moral hazard effects 
on trade credit. 
Therefore, the level of a country’s creditor protection acts in favor of the development 
of the credit markets. This does not occur only in the case of bank credit, as suggested by 
previous studies, but also in the case of trade credit. Furthermore, the improvement of 
creditors’ rights will probably bring benefits to trade relations between suppliers and buyers 
because of the reduction in the moral hazard costs. All these results strongly support our 
approach in explaining the role of the level of creditor protection as a moderator of the 
relationship between trade credit extended and moral hazard costs. 
 
III.5.4. The moderating role of the quality of the accounting system 
 
Finally, to check for the validity of Hypothesis 4, we perform a third estimation to 
confirm whether the quality of a country’s accounting system also moderates the moral 
hazard in trade credit extended. With this aim, we again run the model in Equation 4, but 
this time using a dummy for the AS index as an interaction on BDP. As explained in 
Section 4, this dummy takes the value of one if the accounting system index is greater than 
average and zero otherwise.  
As shown in column III of Table 11, the results for the proxies for adverse selection 
and for moral hazard again support our previous results, that is, all the variables included in 
the model without interactions maintain the same relationship with the dependent variable. 
Turning our attention to the level of the quality of the accounting system, the result 
supports our explanation that in high quality accounting system countries the moral hazard 
effect is mitigated.  Again we perform a linear restriction test whose null hypothesis is 
H0:β1+γ1 = 0 in order to know if the coefficient β1+γ1= -0.0017469 is significantly different 
from zero. As the t-value is –4.89, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero.  
As a consequence, high quality accounting systems mitigate the effect of the moral 
hazard in a trade credit decision. In this case, suppliers from these countries will give less 
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importance to buyers’ risk in comparison to those firms from countries where the quality of 
the accounting system is low. Therefore, results from this last estimation provide empirical 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 4 in that the moral hazard effects on trade credit are 
stronger in suppliers from countries with a low quality accounting system. 
 
III.5.5. Robustness Test 
 
Columns I to III of Table 12 give the results from the same models using as a 
dependent variable TRC, measured by the ratio of trade receivables to total assets. As 
explained before, this measure is a good proxy for trade credit extended because it 
complements DSO. While DSO is used to assess how long trade credit has been extended, 
TRC quantifies the amount of trade credit extended by suppliers. 
 
Table 12: Estimations results - robustness checks 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) 
TRCit-1 0.613973* 0.6074278* 0.6126192* 
 (0.0050757) (0.0035106) (0.0025159) 
BDPit -0.0029648* -0.0203535* -0.0508026* 
 (0.0004333) (0.0005036) (0.0006125) 
CRDit*BDPit - 0.0184557* - 
 - (0.0005032) - 
ASD*BDP - - 0.0480631* 
 - - (0.0006673) 
ROAit 0.0349389* 0.0347032* 0.0361553* 
 (0.0036168) (0.0023283) (0.0020736) 
SIZEit -0.0031483* -0.0045607* -0.0036663* 
 (0.0003261) (0.0001612) (0.0001544) 
DPAit 0.0286654* 0.0287636* 0.0284515* 
 (0.000931) (0.0006222) (0.0002813) 
PQLit 0.0034416* 0.0025737* 0.0033031* 
 (0.0003608) (0.0002128) (0.0001095) 
FIXit 0.0482065* 0.0568653* 0.0479648* 
 (0.0027451) (0.0009841) (0.0016498) 
Const. 0.0608963* 0.0698005* 0.0673014* 
 (0.00514) (0.0041943) (0.0040858) 
T - -36.293338 -7.9482289 
z1 7558.29 (7) 81708.06 (8) 71313.17 (8) 
z2 1481.25 (11) 3559.00 (11) 7239.10 (11) 
z3 115.40 (13) 152.93 (13) 176.81 (13) 
m1 -10.18 -10.16 -10.16 
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m2 -2.31 -2.48 -2.31 
Hansen 551.12 (274) 598.32 (307) 581.13 (309) 
The table presents parameter estimates from panel GMM regressions of trade receivables on several 
different specifications. The dependent variable is the trade receivables divided by total assets (TRC) , and the 
details about the independent variables are in Table 9. The rest of the information needed to read this table is: 
i) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses; ii) *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the null 
hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2, z3 are the Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, 
of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of 
no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residual in 
first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test 
of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
 
As shown in Column I, with the exception of ROA, all proxies for the adverse 
selection and moral hazard phenomena keep the same sign. The main difference here is the 
coefficient of DPA, which is now significant. Our findings support the hypothesis that the 
greater the adverse selection problem the more trade credit offered. Variable SIZE is 
negatively related to TRC and variables PQL and FIX are positively related to it supporting 
that large and low quality producers, with a high proportion of fixed assets, tend to offer a 
shorter period of credit since they have already built a reputation and, therefore, buyers will 
not need long periods to check product quality. The positive and significant sign of the 
coefficient of DPA indicates that as high quality firms extend more trade credit to clients, 
they use this argument to require more trade credit from their suppliers.  
Regarding the coefficient of the BDP variable, it is again negative and significant. 
This result confirms that the greater the moral hazard cost the smaller the trade credit 
offered by suppliers. As a consequence, trade credit extended by suppliers will be a result 
of a trade-off between both phenomena, adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore, the 
outcomes reported here allow us to confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Columns II and III show the results for both extended models, one that CRD interacts 
with BDP and the other that ASD interacts with BDP. As can be seen, the results again 
provide evidence in favour of Hypotheses 3 and 4. In both cases, the coefficients for the 
interaction term (INT) are as expected. These results provide an excellent robustness check 
for our hypotheses. 
In a nutshell, trade credit consists of an agency relationship between suppliers and 
their clients in which, in asymmetric information conditions, buyers will need time to check 
the quality of the goods before paying for them (the adverse selection phenomenon), and 
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suppliers will diminish the time of the credit extended as they do not know the 
creditworthiness of the client(the moral hazard phenomenon). However, in countries with 
high levels of creditor protection or high quality of accounting standards, the moral hazard 
is mitigated since the credit risk is diminished. 
 
III.6. Conclusions 
 
In the present paper we test an agency model to explain trade credit policy. The 
model considers that two phenomena arise from the relationship between providers and 
buyers: adverse selection and moral hazard. In this context, and in asymmetric information 
conditions, trade credit policy is a result of an agency relationship between providers and 
buyers, in which trade credit is extended to allow clients to check the real quality of the 
goods they are buying before the payment is made. In the meantime, sellers do not know, 
ex-ante, the creditworthiness of the buyer and thus they will reduce the trade credit offered 
as they notice an increase in the risk of buyers’ default. This model is then extended to test 
for the moderator effect of different levels of creditor protection and accounting standards 
in the relationship between moral hazard and trade credit.  
When trading with sellers who have not yet built a good reputation in the market, that 
is, in the presence of adverse selection costs, buyers will demand time to check quality 
before payment. In addition, providers will reduce the terms of credit in order to mitigate 
the moral hazard costs that vary depending on the level of creditor protection and the 
quality of the accounting standards in a country. This means that high levels of creditor 
protection increase the suppliers’ probability of receiving the goods sold and consequently 
mitigate the moral hazard effects on trade credit. In addition, high quality accounting 
systems mitigate information asymmetries between buyers and sellers and consequently 
diminish the moral hazard costs. 
This study contributes to understanding the importance of legal institutions in the 
finance of economic activities. In this vein, an important conclusion drawn from this 
research is that countries with creditor unfriendly commercial laws and low quality of 
accounting standards will provide a risky environment for credit, not only to formal lenders 
but also to suppliers when extending trade credit. Therefore, if the high quality of creditor 
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protection and the accounting system acts in favour of the development of the trade credit, 
changes in theses issues should be taken by governments, which should consider all the 
benefits involved for the development of commerce and consequently of the economy. 
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CHAPTER IV – TRADE CREDIT DURING AN ECONOMIC 
CRISIS: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
IV.1. Introduction 
 
During the Asian crisis at the end of the last decade, the Financial Times stated that 
economists are aware that a financial crisis in one country spreads to others and that this 
contagion is usually stronger in times of market instability than in periods of calm. In 
addition, trade and investment links are obvious channels of contagion since a crisis in one 
country deteriorates exports and capital flows to that country's trading partners (Chote and 
Daniel, 1998). If during market turbulence a contagion effect occurs between linked 
economies, then the effect will consequently occur between firms, because they consist of 
trade partners with investment links. This contagion has specific consequences in the trade 
credit supply chain, because suppliers often invest in trade relationships by extending trade 
credit that can tighten as bank credit becomes constrained. 
The study of trade credit during economic crisis periods is an important topic, 
particularly when the global economy is going through a credit shock. Regarding the recent 
2008 global crisis, Kazmin, Lamont, and Leahy (2008) argue that the reluctance of 
commercial banks to lend caused a liquidity shock at every level of the system. This 
liquidity shock caused a shift in trade credit use levels because on the one hand, trade credit 
may act as a substitute source of funds and thus increase, but on the other hand, trade credit 
may complement bank credit and decrease. 
Although significant differences exist in trade credit use for firms around the world, 
trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term finance. According to 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), in countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, 
accounts payable or accounts receivable can reach 25% of firms’ total assets. In general, 
theories that explain  trade credit embrace commercial reasons, transactions costs 
motivations, and financial incentives (e.g., Brick and Fung, 1984; Ferris, 1981; Smith, 
1987; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wei and Zee, 1997; Deloof and Jegers, 1999; Marotta, 
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2005; Bastos and Pindado, 2007; Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2008; Deloof and Overfelt, 2010). 
Recently, some studies appear to explain trade credit uses by firms from different locations 
and with different levels of economic development or legal systems (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003; Horen, 2005; Bastos and Pindado, 2009). 
Only a few empirical studies about trade credit during economic crises exist, such as 
Fukuda, Kasuya and Akashi (2006) and Tsuruta (2007) for Japan’s crisis and Love, Preve 
and Sarria-Allende (2007) for the Asian crisis. However, the impact of an economic crisis 
on trade credit finance is of enormous relevance because a crisis causes trade credit 
contagion as a consequence of financial contagion between financial intermediaries.  
The study of trade credit supply and demand during periods of economic crisis is 
strongly related to the financial view that firms with wide access to credit from financial 
intermediaries finance, through trade credit, those firms with limited credit (Meltzer, 1960; 
Schwartz, 1974). However, Blasio (2005) explains that trade credit determinants contain 
both time-invariant and time-variant components. In this vein, this study argues that trade 
credit explanations must take into account both dimensions of these explanations. 
Therefore, the study examines trade credit demand by considering commercial, operational, 
and financial motives during the Brazilian crisis of 1999, the Turkish collapse of 2001, and 
the Argentine crisis of 2001–2002. The sharp devaluation of its currency marked the 
Brazilian crisis of 1999, along with an increase in interest rates and a decrease in the 
Brazilian reserves of dollars. The Argentine crisis of 2001/2002 was long anticipated 
following the recession that began in 1997 (the Asian crisis followed by the Russian 
default). According to Zurawicki and Braidot (2005), the crisis' strongest symptoms were 
negative growth rates and increases in unemployment. The financial literature at the time 
considered the devaluation of the Brazilian Real against the Argentine Peso and the 
persistent deterioration of fiscal revenues as triggers of the crisis, which caused doubt to 
emerge about the government’s ability to honor its debt. Regarding Turkey, the devaluation 
of 40% in its currency, the Lira, which made repayments of debt in foreign currency 
difficult for banks and businesses, characterized the Turkish collapse of 2001. Peterson, 
Ekici, and Hunt (2010) argue that the Turkish economic crisis of 2001 negatively impacted 
all sectors of the country and caused a worsening in income disparities more than any 
previous economic crisis in that country. In light of the above, this paper presents three 
A trade credit explanation based on the agency theory, legal factors and credit contagion 
   59 
 
main contributions: First, the sample includes firms from three countries that the literature 
does not widely study. Second, the paper explains the effects of an economic crisis on trade 
credit demand. The third contribution is the choice of method. When firms’ trade credit 
policies are studied, two serious problems arise. On the one hand, firms have their own 
specificities that lead to a particular behavior and can influence the trade credit extended 
and used. Consequently, the firm’s unobservable heterogeneity must be taken into account 
in the models because heterogeneity can affect trade credit practices. A potential problem 
of endogeneity exists in the relation between trade credit use and its determinants. 
Therefore, this paper uses the panel data methodology to eliminate the unobservable 
heterogeneity and to estimate the models by using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to control for endogeneity. 
This study empirically observes that trade credit used is positively related to trade 
credit extended, the market power of the customer firm, and the level of investment 
opportunities presented by firms. The study also observes that trade credit used is 
negatively related to firms’ access to credit from financial intermediaries. Also, the study 
finds that during years of economic shocks that a contagion effect enhances the positive 
relation between trade credit demand and the level of accounts receivable. The contagion 
effect also increases the positive relation between trade credit demand and the probability 
of insolvency. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on trade credit and credit contagion and Section 3 reports theories and hypotheses. The 
method and empirical strategy are presented in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses the main 
results and Section 6 presents conclusions. 
 
IV.2. Literature review of trade credit and credit contagion 
 
Trade credit determinants can be classified into time-variant and time-invariant 
categories. Although theories based on price discrimination, product quality, and 
transaction costs are time invariant, theories based on a financial argument are time variant. 
Blasio (2005) argues that trade credit extended by suppliers has both a financial and a 
transaction component. According to this author, the financial component represents an 
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alternative source to bank credit that can vary over time depending on credit market 
conditions. The transaction component is useful for making the exchange of goods easier 
and consists of a time-invariant aspect of trade credit.  
The financial theory of trade credit (Meltzer, 1960, Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 1984) 
posits that firms with easy and large access to credit markets finance those with limited 
access. The tax argument (Brick and Fung, 1984), included in this body of research, 
suggests that if buyers and sellers are in different tax brackets, they have different 
borrowing costs, because interest is tax deductible. As a consequence, suppliers in high tax 
brackets (with lower borrowing costs) are likely to extend trade credit to buyers in lower 
tax brackets (with higher borrowing costs). 
This strand of the literature contains some time-invariant arguments such as those 
presented by Petersen and Rajan (1997), in which suppliers ( i ) have some cost advantages 
over banks in acquiring information about the buyer’s creditworthiness; ( ii ) can also 
threaten to cut off future supplies to buyers; and ( iii ) have more ability to salvage values 
from existing assets that depends on the nature of the goods. However, the access to credit 
markets varies over time and for this reason trade credit policies also are different in 
monetary contractions than in financial crises. 
Many research studies follow Meltzer’s (1960) and Schwartz’s (1974) financial 
explanation for trade credit. Some of them, such as Nilsen (2002) and Baum, Caglayan, and 
Ozkan (2003) focus on the relevance of monetary contractions or macroeconomic 
uncertainty in the trade credit offered by firms. The former find empirical evidence that 
during periods of monetary contractions small firms have less access to bank loans and thus 
use more trade credit. The latter find support for the argument that during macroeconomic 
uncertainty firms turn to their supplier as a source of finance, particularly those larger, high 
growth, non-durable-goods producers. 
Other works in the same strand of the literature provide empirical evidence linking 
trade credit demand and credit rationing; see, for instance, Danielson and Scott (2004). 
According to these authors, credit rationing increases trade credit demand for more opaque 
firms. Wilner (2000) argues that in long term relationships, a dependent creditor grants 
more concessions when a customer is in financial distress. Delannay and Weill (2004), in 
agreement with Marotta (1997) and Nilsen (2002), posit that trade credit acts as a substitute 
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for bank credit in credit-rationed companies such as those from transition economies. In 
another recent paper, Uesugi and Yamashiro (2008) investigate the opposite direction of 
influence, that is, how decreasing the extension of trade credit affects the extension of 
lending from financial institutions. They find that trade credit and bank credit are 
complementary. 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez (2008) study trade credit granted by small and medium size 
firms from the Canary Islands based on the argument that credit-constrained firms have 
suppliers as important substitutes for banks and find that firms with greater access to 
institutional finance act by channeling credit to financially constrained clients. 
As described above, most papers in this body of literature suggest that credit-
constrained firms demand more trade credit than others. However, the offer of trade credit 
during financial crisis periods can follow a different pattern because of a variety of factors, 
such as certain buyer specificities that can increase the borrowing risk and cause credit 
contagion.  
According to Kaufman (1994), contagion consists of the spillover of consequences of 
shocks from one or more firms to others. Giesecke and Weber (2006) define credit 
contagion as the propagation of economic distress from one firm to another. During the last 
decade and at the beginning of this decade, a number of countries experienced financial 
crises and scholars investigated their relation to financial contagion. 
During banking distress, panicked depositors withdraw their bank deposits. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), these withdrawals are a primary mechanism 
through which banking distress affects the real economy. Indeed, this fact also occurs in the 
trade credit supply chain, because panic suppliers diminish their investment in customer 
relationships by withdrawing trade credit or by tightening terms of credit. 
In a recent paper, Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) find that the provision of 
trade credit increases right after a crisis, but contracts in the following months and years. 
They posit that this effect occurs because at first trade credit acts as a substitute for bank 
borrowing, thus offsetting the unavailability of credit from financial intermediaries. Later, 
however,  the decline in bank credit causes a credit scarcity effect for suppliers that tightens 
the terms of credit. 
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According to Tsuruta (2007), if suppliers act as financial intermediaries as well, they 
suffer from credit contagion just as the banks do. He proposes a model for the contagion of 
trade credit in the Japanese crisis of 1997 and suggests that in that period, suppliers were 
likely to diminish the amount of credit extended to all firms, be they high or low risk, and 
to those presenting high values of trade receivables. The argument for this relation is that in 
the case of a serious credit contagion the possibility of default is higher for both high and 
low risk firms, and particularly for those with high trade receivables.    
Jorion and Zhang (2009) posit that contagion effects are stronger for an industrial 
counterparty than for a financial institution in the case of a borrower default, because the 
usual trade credit exposure accounts for a large proportion of supplier assets and usually, 
one or a few buyers represent a large proportion of a supplier's trade credit. Therefore, 
when a buyer files for bankruptcy it is likely to create financial distress for that supplier. 
According to these authors, the bankruptcy of a trade partner leads a firm to a double 
negative consequence, the increase in bad debts and the loss of an important customer 
relationship. 
Jorion and Zhang (2009) explain channels of credit correlation in non-financial firms 
well by dividing the different effects into three categories: (i) intra-industry contagion; (ii) 
contagion effects across industries; and (iii) counterparty effects.  In the intra-industry 
contagion, when Firm A defaults, two opposite effects are expected. On the one hand, there 
are the negative effects on firms in the same industry. On the other hand, competitors of the 
firm that filed for bankruptcy can expand their market share. The contagion effect across 
industries occurs when the default of Firm A, who is a key client of Firm B from Industry 
B, acts as a negative sign of sales prospect for firms in Industry B. The counterparty effect 
consists of losses in Firm B, caused by trade credit extended to Firm A who defaulted. As a 
consequence, a cascading counterparty effect can occur to Firm C who gave trade credit to 
Firm B. This effect can occur successively, causing financial distress to many firms in a 
supply chain. Note that this paper fits in the third category described, counterparty effects. 
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IV.3. Theory and hypotheses 
 
As shown earlier, time-invariant and time-variant factors explain trade credit used. 
The former embrace certain arguments such as those related to commercial motives or 
transaction costs. The latter concern financial motives; however, the financial motivation in 
trade credit uses has both a time-variant and a time-invariant component. In this section, the 
paper explains the hypotheses and theory related to splitting them into two subsections. 
 
IV.3.1. The first dimension: commercial, financial, and operational motives; 
time-invariant components 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) explain that suppliers are better able to investigate the 
creditworthiness of buyers. They have a better knowledge of the industry situation, 
prospects, and threats as they are part of that production chain. In addition, suppliers have a 
strong interest in the survival of their clients and, according to Delannay and Weill (2004), 
suppliers make large investments in the long-term customer relationship, hence they have 
an implicit stake in the buyer. As a result, suppliers have a more accurate perception of 
their clients’ business and investment opportunities.  H1: Firms presenting a high versus 
low level of investment opportunities receive more trade credit from their suppliers. 
Although the financial argument of trade credit posits that large firms are likely to use 
less trade credit because they have more access to external funds (Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
2008) and because small firms are more informationally opaque (Zambaldi, Aranha, Lopes 
and Politi, 2010), the commercial view argues that large firms have more bargaining power 
with their providers. This bargaining power allows large firms to require better payment 
conditions because they can threaten to change to another supplier. In this case, any trade 
credit extended is not the result of a seller decision, but a consequence of the buyer’s 
bargaining power and resultant pressure (Horen, 2005). Indeed, size does not measure 
creditworthiness and banks can not grant credit to large firms simply because of their size. 
The positive relation between size and trade credit received is also in accordance with the 
product quality theory in which small firms that have not yet built their reputation grant 
more credit to their clients. The above explanation can also be based on the resource 
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dependence concept. Dependency arises from the trade relationship with partners. Gopinath 
(1995) argues that when the dependency is asymmetric, the strongest party (in this case 
large customers) exercises control (requires credit) over the more dependent party (the 
supplier). Indeed, Mottner and Smith (2009) affirm that when a supplier becomes 
financially dependent on a powerful buyer, the former gives financial concessions to the 
latter. H2: Large versus small firms receive more trade credit from their suppliers as a 
result of their strong bargaining power. 
As firms sell and buy on credit, those firms that delay in collecting from their 
customers then demand long term trade credits from their suppliers. Indeed, Fabbri and 
Klapper (2008) affirm that firms are likely to match the maturities of the contract terms for 
their payables and receivables. In addition, high quality firms are prone to increase the trade 
credit offered to their clients, and they use this argument to require more trade credit from 
their suppliers. H3: Firms are likely to match the maturities of the contract terms of 
their trade receivables and their accounts payable. 
According to the operation argument, trade credit is a way to reduce transaction costs 
that arise when demand is irregular. Variations in demand cause customer queues, large 
inventories, and, consequently, enhance transaction costs (Ferris, 1981; Emery, 1984). 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez (2008) argues that the use of trade credit enhances commercial 
exchange flows as a consequence of a decrease in costs inherent to cash payment and in the 
uncertainty of the transactions, namely liquidation costs and storage costs. She argues that 
the more active firms use more trade credit as a source of finance. Uesugi and Yamashiro 
(2008) relate the benefits of trade credit uses in the reduction of transactions costs and 
argue that the larger the transaction volume more frequently firms use trade credit. H4: The 
more active a firm is the more trade credit the firm uses. 
As explained in Section 2, trade credit and credit from financial intermediaries can 
represent substitute sources of funds and, therefore, credit-constrained firms apply for more 
trade credit than those with greater access to the financial market. Firms that face 
restrictions to bank credit access usually have low levels of fixed assets to grant as 
collateral and a high insolvency risk.   H5: Firms with reduced access to banks use more 
trade credit than firms with large access. 
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IV.3.2. The second dimension: crisis periods and the time-variant component 
 
A firm can be credit constrained because of its own financial characteristics, such as 
the lack of collateral, low profitability, and high liquidation risk, and these specificities are 
time-invariant aspects. They can also be credit constrained because of a temporary situation 
that affects credit markets, which is a time-variant effect. On one hand, in periods of 
economic crisis, panicked suppliers can diminish their investment in customer relationships 
by withdrawing trade credit or by tightening the terms of credit. But on the other hand, the 
effort made by suppliers to collect earlier might not be enough because of the contagion 
effect that occurs in economic crisis periods. 
This contagion can occur because firms with high levels of accounts receivable do not 
succeed in collecting them in time and have to postpone payments to their suppliers, which 
leads to a credit contagion chain, because suppliers can act in exactly the same way with 
their respective suppliers. Thus, in crisis periods, not only suppliers' credit policy 
determines trade payables, but also a probable credit contagion effect that arises from the 
buyers having high levels of trade receivables. 
The same relation occurs between trade payables and the probability of insolvency. 
As those firms with liquidity problems tend to suffer credit restrictions when appealing to 
banks, they finance themselves by using trade credit. However, their insolvency situation, 
added to the economic circumstances, can reduce the probability of payments being made 
at the proper time. As a consequence, not only suppliers’ trade policy but also buyers’ 
ability to pay determines the relation between trade payables and the risk of insolvency. 
H6: During crisis periods, the credit contagion effect enhances the positive relation 
between trade payables and trade receivables.  H7: During crisis periods, the credit 
contagion effect enhances the positive relation between trade payables and the 
probability of insolvency. 
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IV.4. Data, empirical model, and methodology 
 
IV.4.1. Data 
 
To test all the hypotheses proposed in Section 3, the paper uses firm data obtained 
from Worldscope. The sample is composed of 147 firms and 611 observations from 
Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey covering the five year period from 1999 to 2003, for which 
data for at least three years are available. This study chooses these three countries because 
they recently went through an economic crisis. Although in the last decade and at the 
beginning of this one, several economic crises occurred around the world, the data 
limitations did not allow the study to expand this research to other countries. The 
distribution of the sample by country is in Table 13. The sample excludes  all public 
services and financial firms (SIC 4011 through 4991 and 6021 through 9995). 
 
Table 13: Data distribution by country 
Country Firms Observations 
Argentina 18 74 
Brazil 70 291 
Turkey 59 246 
Total 147 611 
 
IV.4.2. Empirical Model 
 
Because the goal of this paper is to analyze trade credit uses between firms during a 
five year period, which includes some of the latest economic crisis periods, the paper 
proposes to test the following empirical models: 
DPAit=β0+β1DSOit+β2PIit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+εi                                       (1) 
DPAit=β0+(β1+λCRISISt)DSOit+β2PIit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+εi                   (2) 
DPAit=β0+(β1+λCRISISt)PIit+β2DSOit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+εi                   (3) 
As a proxy for our dependent variable of trade credit demand, the paper uses the days 
to pay accounts payable (DPA), measured by the natural logarithm of 360/(cost of goods 
sold/accounts payable). 
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To measure the trade credit extended to customers, the paper uses the natural 
logarithm of 360 / (Net Sales or Revenues / (Current Year's Receivables-Net + Last Year's 
Receivables-Net / 2)), hereafter, days of sales outstanding (DSO). For this variable, it can 
be anticipated a positive relation with the dependent variable. 
In general, firms able to obtain funds from financial markets rely proportionally less 
on financing from suppliers. Usually, firms with a high level of collateral are prone to 
obtain credit from banks. In addition, high-credit rated firms, such as those with a low 
probability of insolvency, are likely to obtain funds from financial intermediaries. Indeed, 
Paul and Wilson (2007) find that firms with difficulties in obtaining finance from banks 
demand more trade credit. The variables used to represent the credit quality of a firm and 
the availability of collateral have the following definitions. 
The probability of insolvency, PI, represents the credit quality of a firm that gives it 
access to formal credit based on the method developed by Pindado, Rodrigues, and de la 
Torre (2008). Specifically, the model that represents the probability of financial insolvency 
is as follows: 
Prob (Y>0) = β0 + β1EBITit/TAit+ β2TDit/MVAit + β3CPit/TAit + dt + ηi + νit           (4), 
where the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one for 
financially distressed companies, and zero otherwise. To classify a firm as financially 
distressed, the firm's leverage has to be above the third quartile or the firm presents an 
earning before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization under the first quartile of the 
sample. The explanatory variables included in the model are Earning Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT) scaled by total assets (TA), Total Debt (TD) scaled by the market value of 
assets (MVA), and Cumulative Profitability (CP) scaled by total assets. The model uses a 
logit model to estimate in cross-section. The values obtained vary from zero to one; thus the 
model is a suitable index to represent the probability of insolvency that creditors assign 
before granting credit to a customer firm. As seen in Section 3, is expected a positive 
coefficient for this explanatory variable. 
In general, firms with low levels of fixed assets are credit constrained because these 
types of assets can be used as collateral in bank loans. If these firms usually obtain credit 
from financial intermediaries, then they show low uses of trade credit, because both types 
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of credit are substitutable. To test for the negative relation between collateral and DPA, the 
model uses the firms’ total fixed assets scaled by total assets, FIX. 
To assess firm size, the model uses the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). This 
variable often represents firm size in financial literature and particularly in trade credit 
literature. The arguments exposed in Section 3 indicate that a positive relation between the 
dependent variable and the SIZE variable exists, because these firms are likely to have 
more bargaining power over suppliers and require better payment conditions. 
Transaction cost theory (operation argument) posits that trade credit is a way to 
reduce operational costs caused by variations in demand. Therefore, more active firms use 
more trade credit from suppliers to finance their working capital. The variable ASTU, 
measured by income divided by total assets, represents firms’ activity. According to these 
arguments, is expected a positive relation between the dependent variable and the DPA 
variable. 
The next explanatory variable is IO that is a proxy for Tobins’ q, also used by Han, 
Suk, and Suk (1999) and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000). The paper measures IO by using 
the market-to-book value of equity. Information regarding investment opportunities gives 
to banks and suppliers an idea of a firm’s future and provides, particularly to suppliers, an 
incentive to maintain long-term relationships with these buyers. In addition, the information 
about a firm’s investment opportunities reduces uncertainty about its future. According to 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), suppliers are able to obtain and use different types of 
information than banks do and they apparently use this information advantage to sell on 
credit to firms of low creditworthiness but which present high business potential. 
Consequently, is expected a positive coefficient for the IO variable. 
Also, the paper creates a dummy variable named CRISIS that takes one if a country, 
i, goes through an economic crisis in year t, and zero otherwise. For the countries 
comprising the sample, the paper considers the following crisis years: 1999 for Brazil, 2001 
for Turkey, and 2001 and 2002 for Argentina. The εit represents the random disturbance. 
Table 14 summarizes each variable and sign. 
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Table 14: Definitions of variables 
Proxy for: Variable Name Expected Sign Coefficient 
Trade credit granted DSO – days of sales outstanding + 
Credit worthiness PI – Probability of Insolvency + 
Bargain Power SIZE – Total Assets + 
Collateral FIX – Fixed Assets - 
Investment Opportunities IO – Market-to-book-ratio of equity + 
Activity ASTU – Asset Turnover + 
 
IV.4.3. Method 
 
The study estimates the proposed model by using a panel data method for two main 
reasons, or problems, that arise when studying trade credit: the unobservable heterogeneity 
and the endogeneity. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, the panel data methodology 
allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. This problem is very important in the 
analysis of firms’ trade credit use, since it may depend on some of the firms’ own 
characteristics. This heterogeneity can lead to biased results. Therefore, the paper controls 
for heterogeneity by modeling it as an individual effect, ηi ,which is then eliminated by 
taking first differences of the variable. Consequently, the error term in the models, εit, is 
split into four components. First, the firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt, which is the time 
specific effects and  controls for some of the macroeconomic influences on the trade credit 
demand decision. Third, as the estimation of the model uses data from three countries, the 
model includes country dummy variables, ci. Finally, νit is the random disturbance. 
The second reason for using the panel data methodology is the endogeneity problem 
that is likely to arise given that the dependent variable may also explains some of the right-
side variables. Particularly, suppliers tend to match their terms of trade credit offered 
(DSO) and received (DPA). However, for these variables there may be a double direction in 
the relation, because, on the one hand, firms may define their trade credit policies and, after 
that, try to negotiate terms of credit with suppliers. On the other hand, firms buy goods 
from suppliers and then, depending on the suppliers’ terms of credit, they decide their own 
policies. Consequently, endogeneity can be a problem that the models need to control for. 
To do so, the paper uses all the right-hand-side variables in the model lagged from t-1 to t-4 
as instruments for the equations in differences, and one instrument for the equations in 
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levels, as Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest, when deriving the system estimator used in 
the paper. Therefore, the models in Equations 1, 2, and 3 are, respectively, as follows: 
DPAit=β0+β1DSOit+β2PIit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+ηi+ci+νit                                          (5) 
DPAit=β0+(β1+λCRISISt)DSOit+β2PIit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+ηi+ci+νit        (6) 
DPAit=β0+(β1+λCRISISt)PIit+β2DSOit+β3FIXit+β4SIZEit+β5ASTUit+β6IOit+ηi+ci+νit        (7) 
In Equation 6, according to the theory discussed in Section 3, when CRISIS equals 
zero (no crisis), β1 is greater than zero because trade credit is expected to be directly related 
to trade debt for countries in periods without a crisis and, consequently, without trade credit 
contagion. However, when CRISIS equals one, that is, in the year t a credit contraction 
occurs in country i, β1+λ is larger than β1 when CRISIS equals zero. The increase in the 
coefficient occurs because suppliers’ efforts to diminish the amount of credit granted to 
firms holding high values of trade receivables are offset by an increase in customer trade 
credit demand as a consequence of the unavailability of bank credit. Likewise, in Equation 
7, when CRISIS equals zero (no crisis), β1 is positive because financial institutions neglect 
firms with a high liquidation risk and therefore these firms appeal for more supplier 
finance. Nevertheless, when CRISIS equals one, that is, in year t a credit contraction occurs 
in country i, β1+λ is positively stronger than β1 when CRISIS equals zero. This result 
occurs because during crisis periods, risky customers are likely to postpone payments of 
goods bought on credit because other sources of credit are scarce. This customer reaction 
gives rise to a credit contagion effect in the supply chain. The expected results from both 
interactions have the same cause and consequences: the trade credit contagion. It seems 
clear that in order to avoid the increase in bad debts, in periods of financial crisis, suppliers 
tighten the terms of credit, particularly for risky firms such as those with a high amount of 
receivables or a high liquidation risk. However, precisely because of the crisis, and 
consequently, credit scarceness, buyers delay trade payments with the aim of surviving 
during the economic crisis. 
Also, for all estimations described the paper checks for the potential misspecification 
of the models. First, the paper tests for the absence of correlation between the instruments 
and the error term by using the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions. Second, 
the paper tests for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residual 
by using the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The paper also uses three 
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Wald tests, z1, z2 , and z3, to verify the joint significance of the reported coefficient, the time 
dummies, and the country dummies, respectively. 
 
IV.5. Results 
 
At first, this section presents some descriptive statistics. After that, the section shows 
the results for the model described in Equation 5. This analysis allows the paper to check 
for the relation between trade credit use and all the variables included in the model without 
considering any crisis or credit contagion. Afterward, the model estimates the interaction 
effect of DSO and CRISIS and PI and CRISIS, as described in Equations 6 and 7, 
respectively. 
 
IV.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation for all variables 
included in the model. Paying attention to the volume of trade credit and trade debt of the 
firms is especially important to the analysis. The average days of sales outstanding is 81, 
while the average of days to pay accounts payable is 59, that is, 22 days shorter. Note that 
correlation coefficients are moderate. 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations 
Variable Mean S. Deviation Median DPA DSO PI SIZE FIX IO TATO 
DPA 59.28 39.41 49.57 1.00       
DSO 81.43 46.48 73.00 0.22* 1.00      
PI 0.42 0.25 0.38 0.20* 0.11* 1.00     
SIZE 12.46 1.46 12.40 0.04 -0.06 0.06*** 1.00    
FIX 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.00 -0.22* 0.38* 0.20* 1.00   
IO 1.41 2.17 1.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.30 * 0.02 -0.21* 1.00  
ASTU 0.99 0.48 0.96 -0.16* -0.30* -0.31* -0.37* -0.40* 0.07*** 1.00 
 
IV.5.2. Testing time-invariant components of trade credit 
 
Table 16 provides the results of the GMM estimation of the models shown in 
Equation 5, 6 and 7. It also provides the heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard 
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error in parentheses, the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of 
non-significance and the Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
The levels of 1%, 5% and 10% of significance are indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and 
of the country dummies are indicated by z1, z2 and, z3, respectively, and degrees of freedom 
are in parentheses; mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residual in first differences, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Regarding 
Column 1, that shows results for the model of Equation 5, coefficients for all variables 
included in the model, except for ASTU, are significant and show the expected relation 
with the dependent variable.  Coefficients for DSO, PI, SIZE, and IO are all positive and 
for FIX, negative. 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, the positive relation between DPA and IO suggests 
that suppliers extend trade credit to those firms with a high level of investment 
opportunities. This result provides empirical evidence that supports the advantage that 
suppliers have over financial intermediaries in acquiring information about buyers’ future 
prospects. This relation has theoretical support in the fact that as suppliers and buyers are 
likely to maintain a stronger relationship with each other than they maintain with banks, 
they  more easily perceive the information about investment opportunities as compared to 
banks. Therefore, the information results in more trade credit granted, since suppliers have 
an interest in the future cash flow of buyers. 
The coefficient of SIZE is positive. This result supports the Horen (2005) argument in 
that suppliers selling to large clients tend to allow payment delays in order to avoid their 
moving to another supplier. In other words, firms with a large market share or ones that 
represent a high proportion of suppliers’ sales have strong bargaining power to demand 
better payment conditions. Therefore, this finding confirms Hypothesis 2. 
The empirical evidence supports a positive relation between trade credit granted and 
trade credit used, because the coefficient of DSO is positive and significant. This result 
supports Hypothesis 3, in that firms that delay collection from their customers, demand 
long term trade credit from their suppliers. 
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According to the financial view of trade credit, liquidity firms with access to financial 
intermediaries finance the credit constrained firms. This proposition is in agreement with 
the substitution argument in that credit-constrained firms substitute bank credit as a source 
of finance for trade credit in periods of credit crisis. Credit-constrained firms usually have a 
high risk of insolvency and a low level of fixed assets to grant to banks as collateral. Thus, 
the positive relation found between PI and DPA and the negative relation found between 
FIX and DPA support these points of view and, consequently, Hypothesis 5. 
In short, trade credit received by firms depends on how credit constrained they are 
when dealing with financial institutions, their investment opportunities, their bargaining 
power to pressure suppliers for better buying conditions, and the extent of the credit they 
grant to their customers. 
 
Table 16: Estimations results 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) 
DSOit 0.14*** 0.10* 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
DSOit*CRISISit - 0.01** - 
 - (0.00) - 
PIit 0.39* 0.39* 0.48* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PIit*CRISISit - - 0.27* 
 - - (0.04) 
SIZEit 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
FIXit -1.00* -1.06* -1.10* 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) 
IOit 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
ASTUit 0.10 0.12** 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 3.01* 3.18* 3.15* 
 (0.36) (0.30) (0.24) 
T - 3.24 11.15 
z1 27.71 (6) 43.01 (7) 61.60 (7) 
z2 7.47 (3) 16.17 (3) 11.14 (3) 
z3 12.69 (3) 15.62 (3) 11.27 (3) 
m1 -2.78 -2.80 -2.89 
m2 -1.33 -1.25 -1.16 
Hansen 114.04 (98) 125.38 (109) 125.04 (109) 
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IV.5. 3. Testing for crisis effects on trade credit 
 
To find out whether economic crisis periods in any way influence trade credit 
policies, the model adds an interaction effect on the DSO variable. The goal of this analysis 
is to check for empirical evidence of credit contagion occurring in periods of crisis. With 
this purpose in mind, as explained in Section 4, the paper constructs a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if in year t, country i goes through an economic crisis, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the model interacts the CRISIS dummy with the days of sales 
outstanding (DSO). Column II of Table 16 reports the results for the model represented by 
Equation 6. 
The results for the influence of economic crisis on trade credit received point to two 
different facts. First, in crisis periods, the dummy variable takes the value of one and, 
consequently, the coefficient is β1+γ1. The paper performs a linear restriction test whose 
null hypothesis is H0:β1+γ1=0 in order to know if the coefficient β1+γ1=0.11 is significantly 
different from zero. As the t-value is 3.24, the paper rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero. This result supports the argument that in moments of credit 
constraints caused by an economic crisis, customers that hold high levels of trade 
receivables postpone payments to suppliers to avoid an increase in their liquidity risk, 
because they might not receive payment for their sales made on credit, and they have no 
other source of finance to use. Second, when there is no economic crisis, the dummy 
variable takes the value of zero and the coefficient is β1=0.10, indicating the usual positive 
relation between trade credit granted and received without the payment delay caused by 
contagion. Of note, in periods without crisis, the positive relation between trade credit used 
and trade credit granted is weaker than during crisis periods. 
Therefore, the results confirm that economic crises affect trade credit uses as firms 
holding high levels of receivables postpone trade credit payment to suppliers, thus giving 
rise to a trade credit contagion and supporting Hypothesis 6.  
To move forward in the examination of trade credit contagion effects the paper 
performs a third estimation to check whether periods of economic crisis influence the 
relation between a firm’s insolvency risk and trade credit use. With this aim, the paper runs 
the model in Equation 7, which includes a dummy for the crisis period interacted with PI. 
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As explained in Section 4, this dummy takes the value of one if country i went through an 
economic crisis in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Column 3 of Table 16 shows the results for DSO, SIZE, FIX, and IO. The results 
support earlier findings in that firms with a low proportion of fixed assets use more trade 
credit, because financial intermediaries neglect them and those firms that are large or 
present high investment opportunities get more credit from suppliers, because they have 
strong market power to delay payables for longer periods and because the suppliers have 
advantages in acquiring information about the buyers’ potential for future growth. 
Turning attention to the impact of crisis periods on trade credit policies by analyzing 
the interaction of the dummy CRISIS on PI, the result supports the explanation that 
economic shocks enhance the positive relation between trade credit used by firms and their 
probability of insolvency. Suppliers that substitute for banks by granting credit to firms 
with a high liquidation risk can tighten credit to them during crisis periods. However, 
customers facing liquidity problems and without any alternative source of credit delay 
payments to suppliers. Again, the paper performs a linear restriction test whose null 
hypothesis is H0:β1+γ1=0 in order to know if the coefficient β1+γ1=0.75 is significantly 
different from zero. As the t-value is 11.15, the paper can reject the null hypothesis and 
concludes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
As a consequence, in periods of credit constraints, suppliers’ efforts to tighten the 
terms of credit to risky firms is not successful because the firms with a high probability of 
insolvency are likely to postpone supplier payments because there are no other sources of 
credit available to them. Therefore, the results from this estimation provide empirical 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 7, in that during economic crises a contagion effect also 
occurs in the relationship between suppliers and their customers. 
IV.5.4. Robustness checks 
 
To test the robustness of the results found, the paper again runs all the estimations but 
uses as a dependent variable the accounts payable scaled by firms’ total assets, TP. The 
paper also changes the proxy for trade credit granted by using the trade receivables scaled 
by firms’ total assets, TR. The use of both measures is very useful in investigating trade 
credit because the variable days to pay accounts payable (DPA) is a proxy for how long the 
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term of credit granted by suppliers is, and the variable TP is a proxy for the amount of 
credit granted to customers. For this regression, some data is lost because of missing values 
for the new dependent variable and, as a consequence, the model is run with 605 
observations. Table 17 presents the results for robustness.  
 
Table 17: Estimations results – robustness checks 
Explanatory Variables (I) (II) (III) 
TRit 0.026* 0.06* 0.05* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TRit*CRISISit - 0.02* - 
 - (0.00) - 
PIit 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PIit*CRISISit - - 0.02* 
 - - (0.00) 
SIZEit 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
FIXit -0.10* -0.10* -0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
IOit 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ASTUit 0.02* 0.01** 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
T - 12.35 10.51 
z1 51.62 (6) 83.67 (7) 45.18 (7) 
z2 3.05 (3) 7.97 (3) 7.93 (3) 
z3 6.87 (3) 9.79 (3) 18.90 (3) 
m1 -2.13 -2.12 -2.09 
m2 0.62 0.75 0.79 
Hansen 111.09 (98) 123.39 (109) 123.81 (109) 
 
As shown in Column I, variables TR, PI, FIX, and IO keep the same sign, which 
reinforces the previous findings and supports Hypotheses 1 , 3, and 5, in that suppliers have 
advantages over banks in acquiring information about buyers’ future prospects; that firms 
delay collection from their customers and, then, demand long term trade credits from their 
suppliers, and credit-constrained firms such as those with a high probability of insolvency 
and  limited collateral, use more trade credit finance. The main difference here when 
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compared with the previous estimation is that SIZE is not significant and the coefficient of 
ASTU becomes significant. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the results for both extended models, one that CRISIS 
interacts with TD and the other that CRISIS interacts with PI. As can be seen, the results 
again provide evidence in favor of Hypotheses 6 and 7 while the remaining coefficients 
keep the same signs. These results provide an excellent robustness check for the 
hypotheses. 
Therefore, trade credit use depends on time-invariant factors such as restrictions to 
formal credit, investment opportunities, market bargaining power and credit granted, but 
also depends on time-variant factors such as an economic crisis. The crisis can cause an 
increase in the restrictions for obtaining credit from financial institutions. So, in these 
periods, although suppliers can tighten the terms of credit to high risk firms, these buyers 
will postpone payment to suppliers as a way to avoid the liquidation risk, since their clients 
cannot pay them on time and because the formal credit markets neglect them and therefore 
suppliers are their last source of finance. 
 
IV.6. Conclusions 
 
This paper tests the substitution hypothesis between trade credit and bank credit. The 
paper also tests for the argument that suppliers have advantages in acquiring information 
about buyers’ future prospects, that large buyers have bargaining power to demand better 
terms of credit from suppliers, and that, during an economic crisis, a contagion effect 
occurs in the granting of trade credit. The explanation for trade credit considers that it is a 
result of time-variant and time-invariant determinants.  
Regarding the time-invariant determinants, trade credit received by firms depends on: 
their bargaining power to acquire long periods of credit from suppliers; the existence of 
high levels of investment opportunities and whether they have broad access to financing by 
financial institutions. As regards the time-variant determinants, trade credit depends on the 
insolvency risk of buyers. If buyers are highly vulnerable to an economic and credit 
contraction resulting from an economic crisis, then they will delay payments to suppliers. 
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This study contributes to understanding the consequences of economic crises on the 
financing of economic activities. In this vein, an important conclusion drawn from this 
research is that suppliers act as valuable agents to offset credit tightening from financial 
institutions when they grant trade credit to low-credit rated firms. Suppliers also act by 
correcting information asymmetries between banks and firms, because they have better 
information about firms’ investment opportunities and this advantage allows them to 
finance the net present value projects of their customers that otherwise go unfinanced and 
not started. Taking this argument into account, financial intermediaries need to find a way 
to diminish their lack of knowledge about firms’ investment opportunities and future 
prospects. Although this paper sheds some light on the fact that during economic crises 
trade credit can offset banks’ credit tightening, this compensation can only occur during a 
short period. After that, suppliers are also credit constrained and then reduce the level of 
trade credit. Understanding this fact is valuable to governments trying to take preemptive 
actions to mitigate the negative effects of a crisis on the economy. 
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CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the main determinants of trade credit 
extended and demanded by firms. We split them into two types of determinants of trade 
credit: internal and external. The first of them considers some firm characteristics such as 
their size, the type of the product sold, the buyer’s risk, the proportion of fixed assets, 
profitability, investment opportunities, and so on. The latter includes some legal aspects in 
which firms are involved or the economic situation that the country of the firm is going 
through. 
In particular, this study shows that the trade credit extended by firms does not depend 
only on a seller trade credit policy, but also depends on the customer’s credit requirements, 
which is a function of the seller reputation. This study also demonstrates that trade credit 
extended also depends on the level of creditor protection, according to the commercial code 
of the country in which the firm resides. Our research also reveals that the accounting 
practices of a country, determined by the law, also influence the trade credit extended by 
suppliers to their customers. In regard to the use of trade credit, it is also demonstrated that 
it depends on firms’ ability to obtain funds from financial intermediaries and depends on 
their investment opportunities as well. It is also shown that economic crises affect trade 
credit use and cause a contagion of trade credit among suppliers and their customers. 
Specifically, based on the agency theory, this study complements the commercial 
argument to explain trade credit extended, in which, in asymmetric information conditions, 
firms sell on credit to allow clients a period of time to check the real quality of the products 
bought before paying for them. We add to this argument that, under conditions of 
asymmetric information, sellers do not really know the creditworthiness of their clients and, 
therefore, they will tighten the terms of credit. 
The findings of this study are consistent with previous arguments that firms sell on 
credit to allow clients to check the quality of the products before paying for them. Indeed, 
we find empirical evidence that high reputation firms, that is, those larger, highly profitable 
firms with a high proportion of fix assets, give less credit than firms whose reputations are 
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not consolidated in the market in which they act. The argument that firms are likely to 
match the maturities of the contract terms for their payables and receivables was also 
confirmed and supported by the empirical evidence found. We also found that high risk 
firms will receive less trade credit from suppliers. In short, this finding seems to indicate 
that trade credit is driven by a trade-off between two phenomena, adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
Based on previous literature that provides empirical evidence of a relationship 
between legal rules and finance, we advance in our study and find empirical evidence 
supporting the argument that when companies belong to different countries, where legal 
rules are different, specifically for the case of creditor protection and accounting standards, 
the risk in granting credit to customers may be enhanced or mitigated depending on these 
rules. When these legal aspects were introduced as an interaction in the agency model using 
a sample of firms from 13 countries from different legal families, we found that high levels 
of creditor protection and high quality in the accounting rules mitigate the moral hazard 
phenomenon that exists in the agency relationship between suppliers and their customers. 
Our findings reveal that legal features affect the trade credit obtained by firms as they 
moderate the credit risk. No one has previously tested for this impact on trade credit by 
using as an argument their role as a moderator in the moral hazard phenomenon. These 
results reveal what we consider to be one of the major causes of the cross country 
differences in the levels of trade credit use. As French-civil-law countries offer creditors the 
weakest protection and the weakest quality in accounting, any kind of credit will be hard 
negatively affected in these countries, including trade credit. 
Focusing on trade credit demand, we then investigated the occurrence of trade credit 
contagion during economic shocks. For this study, we analyzed firms from three countries 
that have recently undergone an economic crisis, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey. Our results 
are consistent with previous arguments that trade credit and bank credit are substitutes. 
According to our results, firms presenting low levels of fixed assets and a high probability 
of insolvency use more trade credit. These findings were expected because firms with low 
levels of fixed assets are unlikely to obtain funds from banks as a consequence of the 
absence of assets to use as collateral. Firms with a high probability of insolvency are also 
banished from formal credit because they are high risk. In both cases, firms must apply for 
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credit from suppliers. Results also suggest the consistency of the argument that non-
financial firms have information advantages over formal lenders in checking the future 
perspectives of a firm. We find that firms with more investment opportunities receive more 
trade credit from suppliers. 
Regarding the impact of economic crises on trade credit demand, our main finds 
suggest the occurrence of trade credit contagion in the supply chain. Results indicate that 
during a financial crisis, firms presenting high levels of accounts receivables will postpone 
payments to suppliers in order to avoid insolvency, since they may not succeed in 
collecting them in time. This behavior will lead to a contagion effect in the supply chain 
since firms’ suppliers may act in exactly the same manner at the time of the payment of the 
goods or services contracted over their own suppliers. We also found that credit constrained 
firms, such as those presenting a high probability of insolvency, rely more on credit from 
suppliers. However, our empirical evidence suggests that this reliance is enhanced during 
economic crises. In other words, our results indicate that, on the one hand, suppliers tend to 
tighten terms of credit to high risk firms during economic crises, and on the other hand, 
customers will delay payments to suppliers since they have no other alternative source of 
funds. This finding is another piece of empirical evidence of the occurrence of trade credit 
contagion during economic crises; since suppliers facing difficulties in collecting their trade 
receivables are likely to postpone their trade payables to their own suppliers. 
As we can see through our empirical evidence, this study is especially important for 
managers, policymakers, and researchers. Managers will profit from understanding the 
main determinants of trade credit, which are useful in planning trade credit policies. The 
knowledge of the type of product (perishable or not, for example) for which customers are 
likely to require large terms of credit is particularly important for them. Some aspects of the 
law are also important in the decision of selling on credit or not. Furthermore, as these 
aspects vary depending on the country, those firms that act in more than one country can 
take special advantage of this information to decide about different terms of credit. 
Understanding customer behaviour during economic crises is also very important for 
managers as it allows them to calculate more precisely the likelihood of the appearance of 
bad debts. Policymakers can benefit from this research since it allows them to understand 
that the impacts of financial crises go further than the financial systems, also affecting the 
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real economy, and to realize that trade credit may not mitigate the lack of credit from 
financial institutions. This research also permits them to understand the consequences of a 
weak accounting system or low levels of creditor protection in the risk of credit supported, 
not only by banks but also by suppliers. The direct implication for the academic community 
is the use of the agency theory to explain trade credit granted by suppliers and its 
immediate consequences; trade credit terms are not only determined by suppliers’ own 
decisions but also by customers’ demand for long credit periods (trade off). The impact of 
legal features and economic crises on trade credit is another step taken by this study that 
should be incorporated into the explanatory models of trade credit. 
To summarize, the thesis proved in this work is as follows: “Trade credit demanded 
and extended by firms is a result of the influence of internal factors (such as the moral 
hazard, the adverse selection, the bargaining power and the investment opportunities 
presented by the customer firm) and is also influenced by some external factors that 
characterize the legal and the economic environment (such as the level of creditor 
protection, the accounting standards and the economic situation).”
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